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ABSTRACT
Background: This study investigates psychological processes associated with distress
in individuals who have experienced psychosis. Previous research has demonstrated
that negative self-schema and illness beliefs may contribute to distress within this
population. However, there is increasing interest in the use of acceptance-based
psychological interventions, which view acceptance of psychotic symptoms as core to
the enhancement of psychological well-being. Conversely, such approaches view
experiential avoidance as a key contributory factor in psychological distress. This
study aims to explore the relationships between self-schema, illness beliefs, and
experiential avoidance, and to investigate the influence of each of these factors on
psychological distress. It is hypothesised that experiential avoidance will mediate the
relationships between negative self-schema and distress, and between illness beliefs
and distress.
Method: Eighty-four individuals who had experienced psychotic symptoms
participated in this study. A battery of measures including the Brief Core Schema
Scales, Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised, Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire-II and Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation, were administered in
an interview-based format to each participant. Data were analysed using path analysis,
an extension ofmultiple regression.
Results: A number of significant direct and indirect relationships between the
variables were demonstrated by the data. Negative self-schema, illness beliefs and
experiential avoidance were all significantly associated with distress, although the
strongest relationship was between experiential avoidance and distress. Data did not
support the hypothesis that experiential avoidance mediated the relationship between
negative self-schema and distress, and only partial support was found for its role in
mediating between illness beliefs and distress.
Discussion: Results indicate that experiential avoidance may be a stronger predictor
of distress in individuals with psychosis than negative self-schema or illness beliefs.




This study aims to explore psychological factors associated with distress in
individuals who have experienced psychosis. The presence of distress is common
within this population and can be associated with a range of negative outcomes. The
current study aims to investigate the role of schemas, beliefs about psychosis, and
experiential avoidance in accounting for distress in this population. It will also
examine the interrelationships between these factors. Schemas and beliefs are central
targets for cognitive therapy, and experiential avoidance is a key process described in
acceptance-based treatment approaches. Experiential avoidance refers to an
unwillingness to experience negatively evaluated internal experiences. There is a lack
of knowledge about the relationships between acceptance and cognitive based
processes within this population, therefore the current study will contribute to
understanding and knowledge within this area.
1.2 Psychosis
1.2.1 What is psychosis?
The term psychosis covers a range of psychiatric disorders, the core symptoms of
which include delusional beliefs, hallucinations and other severe thought
disturbances. The most common and perhaps well known of the psychotic disorders is
schizophrenia (Birchwood & Jackson, 2001). However, other diagnoses such as
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar affective disorder, delusional disorder and psychotic
depression may also be included within the category of psychotic disorders.
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A delusional belief can be described as 'a false belief based on incorrect inference
about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence
to the contrary' (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.765).
A hallucination can be defined as 'a sensory perception that has the compelling sense
of reality of a true perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the
relevant sensory organ' (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.767).
Hallucinations may occur in any sensory modality, but in schizophrenia auditory
hallucinations are considered by far the most common and characteristic (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Thought disorder or thought disturbance typically involves 'incoherence, derailment,
and other forms of marked disorganization of speech' (Nuechterlein & Subotnik,
1998, p. 18). This disorganisation or incoherence of speech is conceptualised as
reflecting an underlying disorder in the organisation of thinking rather than a language
disorder.
1.2.2 History ofpsychosis
A major step in the categorisation of psychoses was taken by Emil Kraepelin, a
German psychiatrist, who in 1896 proposed dividing functional psychoses into two
categories, that of 'manic-depressive insanity' and 'dementia praecox' (as cited in
Berrios & Hauser, 1988). Kraepelin described symptoms of dementia praecox as
including hallucinations, delusions, inappropriate emotional responses, stereotyped
motor behaviour, attention difficulties, flattened affect and emotional dysfunction (as
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cited in: Bentall, 2003; Davison & Neale, 1998; Lavender, 2000). The category of
manic-depressive insanity was used to group together all mood disorders, including
unipolar depression (as cited in Bentall, 2003). However, it was essentially his views
regarding outcome that drove the division between the two disorders. Kraepelin
considered that manic-depressive insanity had a fluctuating course with frequent
relapses, but full recovery between episodes, whereas he described dementia praecox
as having an early onset and following a chronic, deteriorating course (as cited in:
Davison & Neale, 1998; Lavender, 2000).
The work of Kraepelin was developed further by Swiss psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler.
Bleuler differed from Kraepelin in that he held a more favourable view regarding the
outcome of individuals displaying these symptoms (as cited in: Boyle, 1990;
Lavender, 2000). Bleuler did not consider that the illness always resulted in mental
deterioration, therefore disputing that it was a dementia. In addition, he observed that
the onset of the illness could sometimes occur in later life, thus challenging the early
onset that had been proposed by Kraepelin (as cited in Bentall, 2003). Due to this, in
1911 Bleuler introduced the term 'schizophrenia' to replace Kraepelin's dementia
praecox (Bleuler, 1911/1950).
In addition, Bleuler introduced the concept of primary and secondary schizophrenic
symptoms and considered the four primary symptoms of schizophrenia (known as the
four A's) to be abnormal associations, autistic thinking and behaviour, ambivalence,
and abnormal affect (as cited in Buchanan & Carpenter, 2000). He considered the
loosening of associations between thought processes, a form of thought disorder, to be
the central symptom of the illness (as cited in: Buchanan & Carpenter, 2000; Wing,
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1995). Bleuler considered that other features of the illness, including hallucinations
and delusions, were secondary phenomena (as cited in Pantelis, 1996).
1.2.3 Distinction between 'madness' and 'sanity'
The work of Kraepelin and Bleuler has been criticised for assuming that there is an
unambiguous division between the psychologically healthy and the psychologically
disturbed (Bentall, 2003). This criticism can be said to be true of psychiatry in general
since the history of psychiatry has been driven by attempts to seek a clear distinction
between abnormal and normal behaviour. However, such a division can be seen as
arbitrary, and simply reflecting social and cultural interpretation (Bentall, 2003).
The extent to which certain types of behaviour and experience are classed as evidence
of insanity varies significantly according to cultural beliefs and customs. Bentall
(2003) highlights this point by stating that 'it just might be possible to be mad in one
culture but at the same time sane in another' (p. 132). Even within Western society,
disputes regarding the boundaries of madness and sanity have existed since the
earliest days of psychiatry, and have been seen to shift with time, in accordance with
changes in culture. Leff (2001) defines culture as encompassing 'everything that has
been constructed or devised by humankind as opposed to those things that stem
directly from the fact that human beings are biological systems' (p.303).
The notion of psychotic symptoms being socially constructed can be usefully
highlighted by the distinction between delusional and normal beliefs. Bentall (2003)
states that whether a belief is classed as delusional or not is a matter of consensus. In
other words, if enough people within a culture share a belief, then it is not considered
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a delusion. This point is emphasised within the American Psychiatric Association's
definition of delusion, which states that a delusion should not be one that is ordinarily
accepted by other members of an individual's culture or subculture (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). This definition highlights that a belief which is an
article of religious faith, should therefore, not be considered a delusion.
1.2.4 Continuum of 'normality'
It has been reported that a sizeable proportion of the general population experience
hallucinations, or unusual or paranoid beliefs (Olfson et al., 2002; Romme & Escher,
1989; Tien, 1991; Verdoux et al., 1998). However, individuals who experience these
symptoms do not necessarily present to mental health services or meet the diagnostic
criteria for a mental disorder (Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony & Nestadt, 1991; Romme
& Escher, 1989; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Vollebergh, 2001). In fact, it has been
reported that only around a third of individuals who hear voices, actually experience
distress, impairment of functioning, or are troubled enough by their symptoms to seek
help (Romme & Escher, 1996; Tien, 1991).
Romme & Escher (1996, 2000) found that it was not necessarily level of symptom
severity that differentiated between those individuals with a psychotic disorder, and
those within the general population who heard voices. It has been proposed that a key
factor in distinguishing whether individuals come into contact with mental health
services as a result of hallucinations, is the level of distress that such experiences
cause them (Romme & Escher, 1993).
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These findings suggest that rather than a categorical distinction between normal and
abnormal experiences, psychotic experiences are best conceptualised as existing on a
continuum with normal beliefs and experience (Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988;
Strauss, 1969; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000). This challenges the
predominant view in psychiatry over the last century, that psychotic symptoms are
unique signs of biological pathology, 'ununderstandable' (Jaspers, 1913/1963), and
discontinuous with normal experience (Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995).
1.2.5 Reliability and validity of schizophrenia
Although the term schizophrenia has been in use for over a century, it is a term that
has attracted much controversy and major concerns remain regarding the validity of
the concept (Bentall, 1990, 2003; Bentall et al., 1988; Chadwick, Birchwood &
Trower, 1996). Despite the significant contributions that both Kraepelin and Bleuler
made in the field of schizophrenia, it is claimed that both made the mistake of taking
the validity of schizophrenia for granted, and as such did not provide any supporting
evidence for the existence of the concept (Boyle, 1990).
It is argued that the cluster of symptoms that define the diagnosis of schizophrenia can
be present in individuals who do not meet the diagnosis, as well as appearing in other
psychiatric disorders (Bentall et al., 1988; Chadwick et al., 1996; Kingdon &
Turkington, 1998). It has also been said that there is no single common symptom that
is present in every individual who has a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Chadwick et al.,
1996). Arguments such as these undermine the construct validity of schizophrenia and
challenge the view that it is a single diagnostic entity. In addition, the predictive
validity of the term has been questioned, and it has been claimed that the diagnosis is
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limited in its ability to predict outcome and response to treatment (Bentall, 1990;
Fowler et al., 1995; Kelly, Murray & van Os, 2001).
Further to concerns regarding the validity of schizophrenia, the reliability of such a
diagnosis has also previously been demonstrated as being poor (Bentall, 2003;
Kuriansky, Deming & Gurland, 1974). Earlier studies found that psychiatrists were
often inconsistent in assigning individuals a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Beck, Ward,
Mendleson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1962; Kuriansky et al., 1974) and prevalence rates of
the diagnosis also varied significantly between different countries (Birchwood &
Jackson, 2001; van Os, Galdos, Lewis, Bourgeois & Mann, 1993). Differing
diagnostic practices between countries were thought to be responsible for
discrepancies in prevalence rates, and as a consequence, attempts were made to
standardise the criteria for diagnosing schizophrenia, and other psychiatric diagnoses
in general.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric
Association and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) published by the
World Health Organisation, are currently the most widely accepted classification
systems and represent such attempts to improve the reliability of psychiatric
diagnoses. The latest editions of these diagnostic classification systems (DSM-IV
published in 1994 and the ICD-10 published in 1992) have refined earlier criteria and
although there are differences in some of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, the
two systems result in similar prevalence rates (Lindstrom, Widerlov & von Knorring,
1997) and a good level of agreement (Peralta & Cuesta, 2003). However, although
there is good evidence to suggest that the reliability of diagnosing schizophrenia has
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improved, due in part to the use of clearly defined diagnostic criteria, this does not
necessarily equate to improved validity, and as previously outlined, problems with the
diagnostic validity of schizophrenia still remain.
1.2.6 Symptom approach
The poor validity of diagnoses such as schizophrenia, has led to a shift towards
focusing on individual symptoms rather than traditional diagnostic categories
(Bentall, 1990; Bentall et al., 1988; Persons, 1986). It has been stated that 'there are
far too many differences between patients who have the same diagnosis and too many
similarities between patients who have a different diagnosis to make a clear
differentiation between diseases possible' (Romme & Escher, 2000, p. 127). It is
argued that the investigation of individual symptoms, such as hallucinations and
delusions, is more likely to improve our understanding of the nature of underlying
psychological processes (Bentall et al., 1988; Lavender, 2000; Persons, 1986).
1.2.7 Psychological interventions for psychosis
Psychological interventions for individuals with psychosis were initially based on
psychodynamic theories (Wykes, Tarrier & Lewis, 1998). However, such treatments
failed to demonstrate efficacy (Kingdon, Turkington & John, 1994; Scott & Dixon,
1995; Sellwood, Haddock, Tarrier & Yusupoff, 1994), and with the advent of
antipsychotic medications in the 1950s, interest in psychological therapies declined
for this client group. Despite the effectiveness of antipsychotic medications, it is
widely acknowledged that a significant proportion of individuals with psychosis
continue to exhibit distressing and disabling psychotic symptoms even when adhering
to these medication regimes (Bentall, 1996; Fowler et al., 1995; Kingdon et al., 1994;
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Sellwood et al., 1994). Therefore, the value of adjunctive treatments to augment the
effectiveness of medication has become increasingly recognised.
The availability of psychological interventions for individuals with psychosis has
increased extensively over recent years. Although it is beyond the scope of this study
to give a detailed history of all psychological interventions for this client group, it is
useful to highlight some key differences in the primary focus of some psychological
approaches.
One area of focus for psychological interventions has been improving the functioning
of individuals with psychosis in a number of different domains. Such approaches
include family therapies, illness education and management, relapse prevention, social
skills training, cognitive remediation and coping strategy enhancement (Kingdon et
al., 1994; McGorry, 2004; Tarrier, 2002; Tarrier, Harwood, Yusupoff, Beckett &
Baker, 1990; Turkington, Dudley, Warman & Beck, 2004). These approaches are
primarily concerned with increasing an individual's adaptation to the illness
experience, and involve a combination of techniques depending on the specific
approach.
Another key target of psychological interventions has been the psychotic symptoms
themselves. Such approaches involve the use of cognitive and behavioural strategies
in order to undermine the conviction, pervasiveness and intensity of hallucinations
and delusions (Rector, 2004). These approaches have disputed previously held ideas
regarding psychotic symptoms not being amenable to reasoning (Chadwick et al.,
1996; Kingdon et al., 1994). Therapeutic techniques include developing alternative
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explanations for symptoms, and empirically testing beliefs and interpretations
(Chadwick et al., 1996; Turkington et al., 2004; Turkington, Kingdon & Weiden,
2006).
More recently, psychological interventions have developed which highlight the
importance of an individual's relationship with their psychotic experiences, and
emphasise acceptance rather than modification of symptoms (Baer, 2003; Chadwick,
2006). A key therapeutic technique within such approaches is the use of mindfulness
skills.
It has been suggested that reduction of symptoms may not always be the most
desirable outcome from the individuals' perspective (Lobban, Barrowclough & Jones,
2004) and that the ultimate aim of all psychological interventions should be to reduce
the distress associated with psychotic symptoms (Chadwick, 2006; Chadwck et al.,
1996; Morrison, 1998). Psychological distress is thought to contribute significantly to
the resultant impairment for the individual (Tarrier, 2005) and therefore, there has
been a move towards viewing clinical problems in terms of the level of distress they
cause the individual and placing distress, rather than symptoms, as the focus of
therapy (Chadwick, 2006; Chadwck et al., 1996).
1.2.8 Distress and psychosis
The presence of emotional distress has been found to be common in people with
psychotic disorders (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998; Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick &
Trower, 2000; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998). Although distress and emotional disorders
have long been acknowledged within this population, it has been suggested that such
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co-morbid symptoms have often been overlooked in psychological research
(Birchwood, 2003; Tarrier, 2005). This neglect may, in part, be due to the common
perception that distress is an inevitable consequence of the experience of psychosis
(Birchwood, 2003; Birchwood, Iqbal & Upthegrove, 2005). However, research has
demonstrated that distress can occur independently of psychotic symptoms and for
some individuals, several months after remission of acute psychotic symptoms
(Birchwood, Iqbal et al., 2000).
Distress in this population has been associated with a range of negative outcomes,
including increased risk of suicide (Addington & Addington, 1992; Caldwell &
Gottesman, 1990; Jones et al., 1994), relapse (Goldberg, Schooler, Hogarty & Roper,
1977, Johnson, 1988) and exacerbation and maintenance of psychotic symptoms
(Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998; Fowler et al., 1995; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman &
Bebbington, 2001). Therefore, research investigating factors associated with distress
in this population has important clinical implications, since interventions designed to
target these areas could result in significant improvements in outcome.
1.2.9 Summary
Psychosis refers to a range of mental health diagnoses, the core symptoms of which
are hallucinations, delusions and thought disturbance. Schizophrenia is perhaps the
most common and well-known of the psychotic disorders. Although the term
schizophrenia has been in use for over a century, concerns remain regarding the
validity of the concept. This has led to a move towards a symptom approach, rather
than focusing on traditional diagnostic categories. The availability of psychological
interventions for individuals with psychosis has expanded significantly over recent
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years. Although approaches may differ with regard to their primary focus, it is
suggested that the ultimate aim of all psychological interventions should be to reduce
the distress associated with psychotic symptoms. Distress is common in this
population and is associated with a range of negative outcomes. Research
investigating factors associated with distress in this population has important clinical
implications, since psychological interventions that target these areas may result in
improved outcomes.
1.3 The cognitive model
The central tenet of any cognitive model is the notion that an individual's response to
an event is mediated by their beliefs and appraisals, rather than being an inevitable
consequence of the event itself (Brewin, 1988; Chadwick et al., 1996; Chadwick,
2006). Ellis (1962) provided a major contribution in the development of the cognitive
model by proposing his ABC framework, in which environmental or activating events
(A) are linked to the emotional or behavioural consequences (C) by the intervening
beliefs about the activating event (B). Chadwick et al. (1996) emphasised that
different types of cognitive structures are involved within the B element of the ABC
framework, in particular differentiating between schemas, evaluations and inferences.
They suggest that despite the fact that schemas are enduring, and often not tied to a
specific situation or context, they remain an important part of the mediation between
an event (A) and consequences (C) as they inform other types of cognition that are
bound by context, such as inferences.
Similarly, when explaining the cognitive influence on affective disorders, Beck
proposed a hierarchical model of cognitions, in which he postulated that surface-level
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beliefs were based on underlying cognitive structures developed from previous
experiences (schemas) (Beck 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). Therefore,
according to the cognitive model, it is an individual's underlying schemas that inform
their appraisal of events, and it is both of these factors which are considered to
influence the individual's emotional and behavioural response to events (Garety,
Fowler & Kuipers, 2001).
1.3.1 Schemas
Schemas have been described as stable knowledge structures that represent an
individual's total knowledge of self and the world (Davidson, 2008). They are broad,
pervasive themes that develop during childhood, and are elaborated throughout an
individual's lifetime (Young, 1999). However, despite their endurance once formed,
schemas are not always in our conscious awareness and can remain dormant until
activated by relevant events or situations (Beck et al., 1979; Rector, Segal & Gemar,
1998; Young, 1999). Schemas serve as templates for the processing of later
experience and are of central importance in guiding subsequent cognitive processes
(Beck et al., 1979; Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Young, 1999). They can be categorised
according to the type of information they seek to organise (Hollon & Kriss, 1984),
such as self-schema, other-schema and illness-schema. The notion of a self-schema
was postulated by Markus (1977) to describe schema which functions as an active
organiser of self-referent information.
1.3.1.1 Schema development
All individuals possess schemas that develop in response to life experiences. Schemas
are a means of organising experience and are part of normal cognitive development
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(Davidson, 2008). They are essential in allowing individuals to categorise and
interpret their experiences in a meaningful way, and to generally make sense of the
world (Beck, 1972; Garety, Fowler et al., 2001; Hollon & Kriss, 1984). However,
despite the ability of schemas to help individuals navigate through their social
environment, they are not always adaptive, and adverse early experiences are
considered to contribute to the development of dysfunctional or maladaptive schemas
(Davidson, 2008; Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003). Schemas are considered
dysfunctional when the knowledge they contain is both rigid and unrealistically
negative (Scher, Segal & Ingram, 2004).
1.3.1.2 Schema maintenance
A schema is strengthened when information consistent with the theme of the schema
is repeatedly processed (Hollon & Kriss, 1984). Once information accumulates in this
manner, the schema can become very resistant to modification (Hollon & Kriss, 1984;
Young, 1999). However, when information is processed that is inconsistent with our
core schema, then a state of discomfort, known as cognitive dissonance, is produced
(Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance has been described as two cognitions
occurring together that are inconsistent with each other, according to the expectations
of the person (Brabban & Turkington, 2002). To reduce cognitive dissonance, it is
proposed that one of two processes needs to occur. Firstly, the incoming information
may be altered or selectively processed so that it becomes consistent with the pre¬
existing schema, a process known as assimilation (Hollon & Kriss, 1984). Secondly,
the schema itself may be modified in order to accommodate the discrepant
information, a process known as accommodation (Hollon & Kriss, 1984). As schemas
are relatively enduring themes that develop over time, they are extremely resistant to
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change and therefore, the process of assimilation is suggested to occur more
frequently than accommodation (Hollon & Kriss, 1984).
1.3.1.3 Schemas and psychopathology
The presence of negative or maladaptive schemas is thought to create an enduring
cognitive vulnerability to psychopathology (Davidson et al., 1998; Mason, Platts &
Tyson, 2005; Segal, 1988). Such schemas may contribute both directly and indirectly
to psychological distress (Young, 1999). Schemas are considered to indirectly
contribute to emotional responses through their influence on surface-level beliefs and
interpretations (Beck, 1972, 1976; Beck et al., 1979). Thus, negative schemas can be
conceptualised as contributing to negative interpretations and beliefs. It is
hypothesised that depressed individuals hold negative self-schemas, which contribute
to the development and maintenance of negative beliefs through distortions and biases
in information processing (Beck, 1972; Beck et al., 1979; Segal, 1988). Depressed
individuals are thought to fdter out positive self-knowledge and exaggerate negative
self-referent information, in order to maintain consistency between their beliefs and
negative self-schema (Beck, 1972; Beck et al., 1979; Segal, 1988).
1.3.1.4 Schemas and psychosis
The experience of severe adversity, victimisation, social marginalisation, and
exposure to traumatic events, is considered common amongst this population
(Bebbington et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2004; Mueser et al., 1998). In fact, the onset
of psychosis itself can often be a traumatic experience, and the consequences of
suffering from a severe mental illness are thought to add to the adversity experienced
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by this population (Birchwood, 2003; Fowler et al., 1995; Garety, Fowler & Kuipers,
2000).
Negative childhood experiences and negative self-schema have been found to predict
avoidant coping in this population (Drayton, Birchwood & Trower, 1998; Tait,
Birchwood & Trower, 2004), and it is also suggested that negative schemas can
contribute to the formation and maintenance of psychosis (Barrowclough et al., 2003;
Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert & Plaistow, 2000; Garety, Kuipers et al., 2001).
However, other researchers state that it remains unclear whether negative schemas are
the cause or consequence of psychotic experience (Nieznanski, 2003; Smith et al.,
2006). It has been suggested that the relationship is bi-directional, with negative
schemas contributing to the formation of psychotic symptoms, and consequently
psychotic symptoms are thought to increase and reinforce the occurrence of negative
self-beliefs (Barrowclough et al., 2003). The experience of psychosis is thought to
increase negative self-beliefs not only through direct symptom content, but also
through critical and negative reactions from significant others (Barrowclough et al.,
2003).
An influential body of research on the role of schematic beliefs in the formation of
psychotic symptoms has been carried out by Bentall and colleagues, who proposed
that persecutory delusions result from attempts to defend against underlying negative
self-schema reaching consciousness (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood &
Kinderman, 2001; Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). It is
hypothesised that individuals with paranoid and persecutory delusions have a self-
serving attributional bias, where negative events are attributed to external causes, and
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positive events are attributed to internal causes (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Bentall et al.,
1994). Thus, individuals avoid responsibility or self-blame for negative events, and
instead displace blame onto others, resulting in the formation of persecutory
delusions, but protecting against becoming aware of underlying negative self-schema
(Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Melo, Taylor & Bentall, 2006). However, this research has
been criticised, as it has been argued that negative self-evaluative beliefs are common
in people with paranoid and persecutory delusions (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Smith et
al., 2006), thereby questioning the hypothesis that paranoia serves to defend against
this.
Evidence has also been found supporting the notion of thematic links and
consistencies between the content of an individual's psychotic symptoms and their
schemas or past traumatic experiences (Brabban & Turkington, 2002; Fowler, Garety
& Kuipers, 1998; Raune, Bebbington, Dunn & Kuipers, 2006). It is suggested that
psychotic symptoms that are congruent with firmly held negative schemas are more
likely to be interpreted as accurate and are consequently upheld (Close & Garety,
1998; Garety, Kuipers et al., 2001). According to this theory, derogatory or critical
voices would be more likely to be reinforced and maintained in those individuals with
activated negative self-schema. Furthermore, Smith et al. (2006) found that negative
self-evaluative beliefs were associated with psychotic symptoms of a more negative
content.
Negative schematic beliefs have also been postulated as contributing to psychotic
symptoms through their influence on appraisals and beliefs. Birchwood and Chadwick
(1997) hypothesised that schemas, developed in response to past experiences and
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relationships with significant others, may play a part in influencing the construction of
beliefs about auditory hallucinations. They found that core interpersonal schemas
influenced how individuals interpreted their voice, for example whether it was
construed as malevolent or benevolent, or powerful or non-influential (Birchwood &
Chadwick, 1997). Further studies have also suggested that an individual's relationship
with their voices is likely to reflect the nature of their relationships with others in the
social world (Birchwood, Meaden et al., 2000; Yaughan & Fowler, 2004).
Birchwood, Meaden et al. (2000) found that those individuals who regarded
themselves as less powerful and lower in social rank than others, were also more
likely to perceive themselves as subordinate to their voices.
Dysfunctional assumptions about the self, which imply worthlessness, uselessness and
un-lovability, are thought to be common amongst individuals with psychosis
(Kuipers, Garety & Fowler, 1996). Disturbances in sense of self have long been
acknowledged in the literature relating to psychosis, however the topic of self-schema
has received relatively little empirical investigation (Nieznariski, 2003; Robey, Cohen
& Gara, 1989). The experience of chronic illness is known to reduce an individual's
sense of identity and self-concept, although this has been researched more fully in
literature relating to physical illnesses (Beanlands, McCay & Landeen, 2006). A loss
of normal role, restricted choices, acceptance of the illness label, and a sense of
having been changed by the illness, and viewing this change as permanent, are all
thought to contribute to a change in self-identity as a result of the illness experience
(Beanlands et al., 2006; Kirkpatrick, Landeen, Woodside & Byrne, 2001). The
experience of chronic illness has been said to result in the experience of 'engulfment',
whereby individuals are unable to reconstruct a valued non-illness self-concept, so
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begin to define themselves in terms of their illness (Beanlands et al., 2006). In
accordance with this, it has been suggested that individuals with psychosis may
perceive themselves not only as experiencing psychosis, but of becoming 'psychotic'
(Nieznanski, 2003).
Recent studies have found that individuals with psychosis report extreme negative
evaluations of both self and others (Fowler et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006), with the
exception of individuals who experience grandiose delusions, which have been
inversely associated with negative self-schema (Smith et al., 2006). Negative self-
schemas have also been associated with increased emotional distress and
preoccupation with symptoms (Garety, Kuipers et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2006).
There is still considerable debate about the exact nature and significance of the
schema construct in psychosis and different theories have different hypotheses,
especially in relation to different types of psychotic symptom. Further research
investigating schemas in individuals with psychosis is merited, in particular




The beliefs that an individual constructs about their illness are thought to be central to
the process by which they attempt to understand and make sense of the illness
experience (Vaughan, Morrison & Miller, 2003). In physical health research many
studies have demonstrated that the beliefs individuals hold about their illness are
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important in predicting emotional and behavioural responses, and have been shown to
be related to health outcomes, such as treatment adherence and compliance (Millar,
Purushotham, McLatchie, George & Murray, 2005; Scharloo et al., 2005; Schiaffino,
Shawaryn & Blum, 1998). Illness beliefs have been shown to be amenable to change
and thus have become important targets for interventions (Lobban, Barrowclough &
Jones, 2003).
1.3.2.2 Beliefs about psychosis
Negative beliefs about psychosis have been found to be associated with the
development of depression (Birchwood, Mason, MacMillan & Healy, 1993; Iqbal,
Birchwood, Chadwick & Trower, 2000; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998), anxiety
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Gumley, O'Grady, Power & Schwannauer, 2004; Karatzias,
Gumley, Power & O'Grady, 2007), low self-esteem (Watson et al., 2006), and
distress (Lobban et al., 2004). In addition, it has been suggested that such beliefs may
contribute to the maintenance of psychotic symptoms (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998;
Fowler et al., 1995; Garety, Kuipers et al., 2001). Negative beliefs about psychosis
have also been found to be significantly associated with outcomes including quality of
life, overall level of functioning (Lobban et al., 2004) and relapse (Gumley et al.,
2006).
It has been demonstrated that levels of distress are not purely a consequence of the
presence of psychotic symptoms (Lobban et al., 2004) and that, for some individuals,
an increase in emotional distress occurs after the remission of such symptoms
(Birchwood, Iqbal et al., 2000). An individual's appraisal of the psychotic experience
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has been found to be a key factor in the emergence of post-psychotic depression
(Birchwood et al., 2006; Iqbal et al., 2000).
Birchwood et al. (1993) found that perceived control over illness was a significant
contributor to emotional dysfunction in individuals with schizophrenia. They found
that a more external locus of control was associated with increased levels of
depression (Birchwood et al., 1993). Appraisals regarding the controllability of
psychotic symptoms have also been demonstrated to be associated with hopelessness
(Hoffman, Kupper & Kunz, 2000), distress (Freeman & Garety, 1999), and type of
coping strategy used (Romme, Honig, Noorthoorn & Escher, 1992).
Negative beliefs regarding mental illness, including stigmatisation, social
marginalisation and experience of shame regarding diagnosis, have been found to be
associated with depression (Birchwood et al., 1993) and social anxiety (Birchwood et
al., 2006) in this population. Other studies have also found that appraisals of loss,
humiliation, entrapment, and self-blame regarding the cause of psychosis, have been
associated with depression (Iqbal et al., 2000; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998) and
anxiety (Gumley et al., 2004; Karatzias et al., 2007).
1.3.2.3 Beliefs about auditory hallucinations
Beliefs about voices, rather than voice content alone, have been found to be important
in understanding an individual's emotional and behavioural response to the
experience of auditory hallucinations (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick &
Birchwood, 1994, 1995). It has been suggested that beliefs about voices may mediate
emotional, physiological and behavioural responses, in a similar manner that
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catastrophic misinterpretations mediate the relationship between physiological
arousal, emotions and behaviour in panic disorder (Morrison, 1998). In particular, it is
proposed that if auditory hallucinations are appraised as uncontrollable, dangerous
and interpreted as physically or psychologically threatening to the individual, then it
is likely that this will be associated with increased distress (Morrison, 1998; Morrison,
Wells & Nothard, 2000). In addition, beliefs about a voice's identity, purpose (e.g.,
whether it is perceived as benevolent or malevolent), power, and beliefs about the
consequences of obedience and disobedience have also been emphasised as being
particularly important in determining emotional and behavioural responses (Chadwick
et al., 1996).
Chadwick and Birchwood (1994, 1995) found that individuals who believed their
voices to be benevolent were more likely to engage with them, whereas individuals
who viewed their voices as malevolent were more likely to try to resist or eradicate
them. Beliefs that voices are malevolent have also been found to be associated with
increased depression (Chadwick et al., 1996) and distress (Chadwick & Birchwood,
1994).
Studies have found that individuals frequently perceive their voices as extremely
powerful (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Close &
Garety, 1998) and that these beliefs are associated with higher levels of depression
(Chadwick & Birchwood, 1996). Individuals who believe their voices are both
omnipotent and malevolent are more likely to experience anxiety and depression
(Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; van der Gaag, Hageman & Birchwood, 2003) and
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individuals who believe that their voices are omniscient and omnipotent have been
found to experience greatest difficulty in coping (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994).
1.3.2.4 Beliefs and voice content
Research has shown that beliefs about voices are not necessarily directly influenced
by voice content. It has been suggested that up to 50% of individuals who hear voices,
may hold beliefs about these voices that are either not explicable by reference to voice
content, or are directly incongruous with voice content (Birchwood, Meaden, Trower
& Gilbert, 2002; Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995; Chadwick et al., 1996). In fact, a
study by Birchwood and Chadwick (1997) found that neutral observers rated voice
beliefs as 'following directly' from voice content in only a quarter of cases in their
sample. These findings have important clinical implications since they suggest that,
even with continuing negative content, distress may be reduced by changing
individuals' beliefs about their voices (van der Gaag et al., 2003).
1.3.3 Summary
According to the cognitive model, the relationship between psychotic symptoms and
emotional and behavioural responses is mediated by underlying schema and surface-
level cognitions. Negative schemas are viewed as stemming from adverse early
experiences and are proposed to influence surface-level beliefs through information
processing biases and distortions. Individuals with psychosis have been found to hold
negative schematic beliefs regarding both self and others. Beliefs about psychotic
symptoms have been demonstrated to influence both behavioural and emotional
reactions to these experiences, and these beliefs are not always directly related to
symptom content. Both schemas and cognitions are considered amenable to change
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through psychological therapy, therefore have become important targets for
interventions. According to the cognitive theory, emotional and behavioural outcomes
may be improved by altering negative or dysfunctional schemas and beliefs.
1.3.4 Cognitive Therapy
Cognitive Therapy was originally developed for the treatment of depression (Beck,
1976) but has since been applied to a wide range of other clinical disorders. Although
Beck published an early case study on the use of cognitive therapy for the treatment
of delusions (Beck, 1952), it is only more recently that the approach has become
established as a potential treatment intervention for psychotic disorders. Psychotic
symptoms were traditionally not seen as amenable to reasoning, and this together with
assumptions regarding the cognitive deficits of individuals with psychosis, may
account for the delay in empirically investigating cognitive therapy with this
population (Gaudiano, 2005; Gould, Mueser, Bolton, Mays & Goff, 2001).
Cognitive Therapy is based on the underlying theoretical rationale that an individual's
affect and behaviour are largely determined by their beliefs and the way in which they
structure the world (Beck, 1972, 1976; Beck et al., 1979). The approach aims to
reduce distress and dysfunction by modifying unhelpful beliefs and assumptions
(Chadwick et al., 1996; Gaudiano, 2005). Therapeutic techniques include identifying
negative or dysfunctional thoughts and beliefs, reviewing evidence for these beliefs
and identifying thinking biases, encouraging self-monitoring of cognitions, and
learning to identify and alter the dysfunctional schemas underlying these cognitions
(Beck et al., 1979; Garety et al., 2000; Garety, Fowler et al., 2001). A central theme
in cognitive therapy is relating cognitions to mood and behaviour. In addition to the
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cognitive techniques outlined above, a number of behavioural strategies are also
utilised within cognitive therapy, not only to change behaviour, but also to elicit
cognitions associated with specific behaviours and to test specific maladaptive
cognitions and assumptions (Beck et al., 1979). Due to this behavioural aspect, the
term cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) is also used to describe this type of approach.
Initially, cognitive therapy was used primarily for those individuals with persistent
and medication resistant hallucinations and delusions. However, it has recently been
more widely applied within psychosis, including as an intervention in early or first
episode psychosis (Addington & Gleeson, 2005; Gumley et al., 2003) and as a means
of promoting recovery from acute psychotic episodes (Lewis et al., 2002).
1.3.4.1 Evidence base
Although cognitive therapy has some strong empirical support for treating a range of
psychological conditions, it is only more recently that its efficacy in treating psychotic
disorders has been examined (Gaudiano, 2005). Despite this, there does appear to be
growing evidence for its effectiveness in reducing positive psychotic symptoms
(Gould et al., 2001; Rathod, Kingdon, Weiden & Turkington, 2008; Tarrier et al.,
1998) and the UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has
recommended CBT as a treatment for individuals with schizophrenia (NICE, 2002).
A number of meta-analyses have been published which generally conclude that CBT
is an effective adjunct intervention for individuals with psychosis (Gould et al., 2001;
Pilling et al., 2002; Rector & Beck, 2001; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004; Wykes, Steel,
Everitt & Tarrier, 2008; Zimmermann, Favrod, Trieu & Pomini, 2005). Overall, the
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more rigorous meta-analyses have shown a modest effect size between CBT and
standard care in improving positive symptoms (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004; Wykes et al.,
2008; Zimmermann et al., 2005), which Tarrier and Wykes (2004) suggest is not
surprising given the severity of the disorder. However, many of the studies involve
significant methodological limitations, and it has been suggested that this could
artificially inflate the effect size. In particular, a common criticism has been the lack
of double blind assessment, and it has been demonstrated that when studies attempted
masked assessment, almost a 60% reduction in the effect size was noted (Wykes et
al., 2008).
Although many studies have found that CBT can be an effective intervention for
individuals with psychosis, this effectiveness is far from conclusive. There has been
significant variation and inconsistencies between studies in terms of their findings,
and in particular trials comparing CBT to other non-specific interventions, have
yielded less impressive findings (Gaudiano, 2005; Haddock, Tarrier et al., 1999;
Sensky et al., 2000). Supportive counselling and befriending have been shown to be
equally effective as CBT in reducing symptoms (Haddock. Tarrier et al., 1999;
Sensky et al., 2000). However, one of these studies was a small pilot study (Haddock,
Tarrier et al., 1999) and the other showed that the benefits of befriending were limited
to the duration of the intervention, whereas CBT showed continued improvement at
follow up (Sensky et al., 2000). Findings from other studies also suggest that the
therapeutic effects of CBT may continue when therapy finishes, or at least are
preserved (Kuipers et al., 1998; Tarrier et al., 1999; Zimmermann et al., 2005).
However, inconsistencies in findings are again present and a recent systematic review
concluded that CBT improved psychological functioning over the short and medium
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term only and after one year the difference was no longer significant (Jones, Cormac,
Silveira da Mota Neto & Campbell, 2004).
The variability between findings from different studies has been attributed to a
number of possible sources, including differences in the content, format, duration and
emphasis of therapy (Gould et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2004; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004),
and variation in the nature of treatment-as-usual or control groups (Tarrier & Wykes,
2004; Wykes et al., 2008). Gumley and Schwannauer (2006) also suggest that some
of the variability in findings may be due to variation in outcome measures used and
heterogeneity of samples in terms of symptoms and diagnoses.
In conclusion, while evidence supporting the use of CBT for psychosis appears to be
promising, many researchers have advocated that findings should be interpreted
cautiously given the methodological limitations of some studies (Jones et al., 2004;
Tarrier & Wykes, 2004; Wykes et al., 2008). Further research is needed in this area,
in particular to determine which individuals are most likely to benefit from this
intervention, and to identify the specific mechanisms or components responsible for
treatment effectiveness (Gaudiano, 2005; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004; Wykes et al., 2008;
Zimmermann et al., 2005).
1.4 Acceptance-based approaches
Treatment interventions for individuals with psychosis have traditionally focused on
eliminating or reducing psychotic symptoms as a primary outcome. Interventions that
aim to directly alter problematic or negative internal experiences in this way have
been termed 'first-order change' strategies (Hayes & Wilson, 2003; Zettle et al.,
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2005). Cognitive therapy is an example of such an intervention, as it aims to change
the content of negative or dysfunctional thoughts in an attempt to reduce problematic
affective or behavioural responses.
More recently a 'third wave' of cognitive and behaviour therapies have emerged,
which emphasise acceptance rather than control of symptoms (Hayes, 2004). These
interventions place greater emphasis on so-called 'second-order change' and aim to
change the way individuals relate to negatively evaluated internal experiences. Such
approaches include Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl &
Wilson, 1999), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams &
Teasdale, 2002), and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993).
Acceptance-based approaches have been described as 'facilitating therapeutic change
by altering the context within which private events function' (Zettle et al., 2005,
p.512). From this perspective, the form or content of cognition is not considered
directly problematic unless contextual features lead this cognitive content to regulate
behaviour in unhelpful ways (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006).
Problematic contexts would be seen as 'those in which private events need to be
controlled, explained, believed, or disbelieved, rather than being experienced' (Hayes,
Masuda, Bissett, Luoma & Guerrero, 2004, p.45). Techniques such as mindfulness,
cognitive defusion, and acceptance are utilised within these approaches to encourage
non-evaluative contact with internal experience (Hayes & Wilson, 2003).
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1.4.1 Mindfulness
Mindfulness has been described as 'the awareness that emerges through paying
attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgementally to the unfolding
of experience moment by moment' (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). Meditation exercises
are central to developing the ability to direct one's attention in this way (Baer, 2003).
A core goal of mindfulness is to 'learn how to become aware of, observe and react
less habitually to sensations, thoughts and feelings' (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona &
McQuaid, 2004, p.435).
The practice of mindfulness stems from Eastern spiritual traditions, such as
Buddhism, but in recent decades has become increasingly popular within Western
society. It has been suggested that the cultivation ofmindfulness may be beneficial to
individuals experiencing a wide range of mental health difficulties and as such, the
approach has gained considerable interest within the field of mental health
interventions (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006).
It has been suggested that mindfulness can be useful in reducing distress associated
with negative schematic beliefs about the self (Chadwick, 2006). Such beliefs are
often characterised by avoidance, intense negative judgement, and rumination
(Chadwick, 2006), and mindfulness can provide a means of 'decentring' from these
beliefs and consequently 'a more flexible notion of the self and a more fluid
relationship to the content of the mind' (Ramel et al., 2004, p.435) can be achieved.
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1.4.2 Cognitive defusion
Cognitive defusion refers to the process ofweakening the literal meaning of thoughts,
so that thoughts and feelings are experienced for what they are, rather than taken to be
true interpretations of the experience (Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, Twohig
& Wilson, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999). It is based on the idea that no private
experiences are inherently toxic when they are experienced for what they are, no
matter how aversive their content, but instead their toxicity derives from viewing
them as what they claim to be, such as bad or harmful (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006;
Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et al., 2004). Cognitive defusion techniques involve
individuals observing 'thoughts and the process of thinking without assuming that
thoughts are true or important and without always behaving in accordance with their
content' (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006, p.24).
The process of cognitive defusion can be considered to share some similarity with the
procedures used within cognitive therapy (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Blackledge,
2007). For example, cognitive therapy encourages individuals to observe and monitor
their thoughts, and to step back from dysfunctional thoughts, viewing them as beliefs
and hypotheses to be tested, rather than facts (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Blackledge,
2007). However, although there may be similarities in the processes employed by
cognitive therapy and acceptance-based approaches, their ultimate aims differ. In
cognitive therapy, the process of identifying and observing thoughts is used as a
mechanism through which thought content can be modified or altered, rather than the
primary mechanism of therapeutic change (Teasdale et al., 2002). In acceptance-
based approaches, this process of 'deliteralisation' is considered a means of increasing
psychological acceptance (Wilson, Hayes & Gifford, 1997). The ultimate aim of
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cognitive defusion in acceptance-based approaches is to reduce the behavioural
impact of thoughts, and allow constructive behaviour even in the presence of
unwanted private experiences (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Blackledge, 2007).
1.4.3 Acceptance
Psychological acceptance has been described as 'taking a stance of non-judgmental
awareness and actively embracing the experience of thoughts, feelings, and bodily
sensations as they occur' (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et ah, 2004, p.7). The importance
of psychological acceptance has been emphasised in traditions such as
psychoanalytic, humanistic and existential approaches (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes,
Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl, 1996). However, it is claimed that its importance
has been neglected in many empirical therapies, and that the significance of changing
unpleasant symptoms, thoughts and emotions has been overemphasised (Baer, 2003).
The importance of psychological acceptance has been demonstrated across a wide
range of clinical disorders (Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008) and has been found to be
significantly associated with positive clinical outcomes (Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes et
al., 1999). Conversely, the alternative to acceptance, experiential avoidance, has been
described as an extremely toxic and pathological process (Hayes 2004; Hayes et al.,
1999) that is detrimental to well-being (Hayes et al., 1996).
1.4.3.1 Experiential avoidance
Experiential avoidance has been described as 'the phenomenon that occurs when a
person is unwilling to remain in contact with particular private experiences (e.g.,
bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioural predispositions) and
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takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these events and the contexts that
occasion them' (Hayes et al., 1996, p.1154). This unwillingness to remain in contact
with negatively evaluated private experiences, and persistent attempts to alter their
form or the contexts in which they arise, is thought to be critical to the development
and maintenance of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1999). Experiential avoidance is
proposed to be a stronger contributor to psychopathology than the content of such
experiences (Hayes et al., 1999; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth & Steger, 2006; Plumb,
Orsillo & Luterek, 2004).
Research suggests that experiential avoidance may play a significant role in the
development and maintenance of psychological distress (Plumb et al., 2004), and
contributes to overall psychological inflexibility (Hayes et al, 1999). Experiential
avoidance has been implicated in a variety of clinical disorders (Chawla & Ostafin,
2007; Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004; Ost, 2008) and has
been strongly correlated with measures of general psychopathology in both clinical
and non-clinical samples (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al.,
2004).
The immediate effects of experiential avoidance are often seemingly positive (Hayes,
Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1996). However, in the long-term such
deliberate control strategies are thought to paradoxically increase the severity of these
internal experiences, thus maintaining or exacerbating psychological difficulties and
distress, which presumably leads to further avoidance (Andrew & Dulin, 2007; Hayes
et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 1996). Experiential avoidance has been described as a
disordered and harmful process when it is applied rigidly and inflexibly, such that an
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enormous amount of time, effort and energy becomes devoted to managing,
controlling, or struggling with internal experience (Kashdan et ah, 2006). It has been
proposed that such rigid attempts to avoid these negatively evaluated private
experiences, consequently restricts an individual's behavioural repertoire, and reduces
the occurrence ofmeaningful life activities (Hayes et al., 1999; Kashdan et al., 2006).
Research has demonstrated that greater experiential avoidance is more likely to be
associated with lower quality of life and reduced life satisfaction (Hayes, Strosahl,
Wilson et al., 2004; Kashdan et al., 2006).
1.4.3.2 Experiential avoidance and psychosis
Avoidant coping has been found to be common amongst individuals with psychosis
(Tait et ah, 2004; Thompson, McGorry & Harrigan, 2003) and methods of
suppressing psychotic symptoms, including deliberate ignoring and distraction, are
frequently reported within this population (Shergill, Murray & McGuire, 1998).
Previous research has indicated that suppression-based coping strategies are more
likely to be applied to private experiences associated with high social disapproval or
to those with content relating to harming oneself or others (Freeston & Ladouceur,
1993; Purdon & Clark, 1994). Thus, psychotic symptoms could be considered a
natural target for suppression and avoidant-type coping strategies.
Avoidant coping strategies have been associated with increased levels of
psychological distress and depression (Drayton et ah, 1998) and reduced quality of
life (Thompson et ah, 2003) amongst individuals with psychosis. In addition, it has
been proposed that such strategies impact negatively on psychotic symptoms, in
particular exacerbating intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations (Morrison,
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Haddock & Tarrier, 1995). In accordance with this, Romme and Escher (1993) found
that individuals with psychosis who used distraction-based coping strategies
frequently dealt poorly with the experience of auditory hallucinations.
1.4.4 Acceptance and mindfulness-based treatment approaches
Despite promising empirical support for the use of CBT with individuals with
psychosis, a significant proportion of individuals with these symptoms do not respond
to these interventions (Gaudiano, 2005). Kuipers et al. (1997) in their controlled trial
of CBT for psychosis, found that 50% of their sample demonstrated a positive
response to the intervention, whereas the other 50% showed little or no response.
Therefore, in an attempt to augment the effectiveness of CBT for this population,
recent approaches have begun to introduce the inclusion of acceptance and
mindfulness-based strategies into cognitive behavioural interventions (Bach,
Gaudiano, Pankey, Herbert & Hayes, 2006; Chadwick, 2006; Gaudiano, 2005).
1.4.4.1 Mindfulness and cognitive therapy
Mindfulness, like cognitive therapy, is based on the premise that distress is not
inherent in experiences or sensations, but is mediated by an individual's reaction to
such experiences (Abba, Chadwick & Stevenson, 2008; Chadwick. 2006). Unlike
cognitive therapy, which emphasises the beliefs an individual holds and the meaning
they ascribe to events as key mediating factors driving emotional and behavioural
reactions, mindfulness focuses on an individual's relationship with their experiences,
in explaining these outcomes. It is increasingly recognised that an individual's
relationship with their symptoms and internal experience is important in predicting
distress (Chadwick, 2006). Thus, these methods rather than effecting change through
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modification of belief content, as in cognitive therapy, aim to change the individual's
relationship to their beliefs, experiences and symptoms (Shawyer et al., 2007).
However, both mindfulness and cognitive therapy are seen to have the common goal
of alleviating distress and promoting emotional well-being (Chadwick, 2006).
It has been suggested that there are conceptual consistencies between mindfulness and
cognitive therapy approaches, which make them appropriate for integration within a
single treatment intervention (Baer, 2003; Chadwick, 2006; Gaudiano, 2005). As
outlined above, they both share the common aim of alleviating distress and both view
the source of distress as mediated by factors intrinsic to the individual, rather than a
direct consequence of events (Chadwick, 2006). In addition, it has been suggested that
the process of metacognitive insight is central to both approaches, and key to the
process of change (Chadwick, 2006). Metacognitive insight has been defined as 'an
observation about a general quality of sensations, cognitions, emotions or the
relationships among them' (Chadwick, 2006, p. 18). Chadwick (2006) states that in
CBT, metacognitive insight is fostered by encouraging clients to recognise that their
beliefs are in fact beliefs, rather than facts, and similarly in mindfulness, individuals
are encouraged to decentre from cognitions and perceive them as transient objects of
awareness.
As previously outlined, mindfulness strategies have been integrated into a number of
third wave treatment approaches. However, probably the most empirically researched
approach within the area of psychosis is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT,
said as one word rather than as initials', Hayes et al., 1999).
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1.4.4.2 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
ACT is part of the behaviour therapy tradition, and is based on a behavioural theory of
psychopathology that suggests that psychological distress often results from
maladaptive attempts to avoid or escape emotions, thoughts, or other private
experiences (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006; Hayes, Strosahl &
Bunting, 2004; Wilson et al., 1997). From this perspective, problematic or
dysfunctional cognitions are not viewed as the cause of negative affect or maladaptive
behaviours (Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al., 1997). Instead, ACT views
psychopathology as resulting from psychological inflexibility, which is considered to
be dominantly the result of two processes, cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance
(Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et al., 2004).
The general goal of ACT is to increase psychological flexibility, which is defined as
The ability to contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and
to either change or persist when doing so serves valued ends' (Hayes, Strosahl,
Bunting et al., 2004, p.5). ACT aims to increase psychological flexibility through the
use of acceptance and mindfulness strategies, together with commitment and
behaviour change strategies (Hayes et al., 2006; Shawyer et al., 2007). Acceptance
and mindfulness strategies involve undermining attempts at control of symptoms and
internal experience, as well as diminishing the role of literal thought (Hayes, Masuda
et al., 2004). Commitment and behaviour change strategies have been described as
those which encourage individuals to develop larger and larger patterns of effective
action linked to chosen values (Hayes et al., 2006; Shawyer et al., 2007). Individuals
are encouraged to abandon attempts at controlling thoughts and feelings, and instead
interventions aim to increase willingness to experience private events while at the
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same time behaving consistently with their chosen values (Baer, 2003; Hayes,
Masuda et al., 2004; Hayes et ah, 1999). Therefore, acceptance is not an end in itself,
but is fostered as a method of increasing values-based action (Hayes et al., 2006).
Experiential avoidance is a central concept in ACT (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006;
Hayes et al., 1999) and various mindfulness and acceptance exercises are practiced to
decrease avoidance or struggle with internal experiences (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006).
Experiential avoidance is thought to interfere with the ability of individuals to live in
accord with their core values (Kashdan et al., 2006). Thus, by reducing experiential
avoidance the aim is to encourage individuals to develop greater psychological
acceptance, and engagement in valued behaviours (Hayes et al., 1999).
Cognitive fusion, where individuals are entangled with the literal meaning of
thoughts, is conceptualised as a process that supports experiential avoidance.
Therefore, cognitive defusion is also a key aim of ACT interventions. Ultimately,
ACT aims to alter the contexts in which thoughts occur, so as to diminish the impact
and importance of difficult private experiences (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et al.,
2004). For example, interventions may focus on weakening or undermining contexts
characterised by a dominance of literal language, or those social contexts which
support the evaluation of certain experiences as 'good' or 'bad' (Hayes et al., 1999).
1.4.4.3 Evidence base forAcceptance and Commitment Therapy
Research investigating the empirical evidence base of ACT is still in its infancy.
However, there is growing evidence to suggest that it may be an effective intervention
for a wide range of problems (Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes, Masuda et al., 2004). In a
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recent independent review of the evidence base, Ost (2008) found moderate to large
effect sizes for ACT, however concluded that the methodologies of these studies were
less stringent than those for CBT. This review stated that as the current evidence
stands ACT does not fulfil the criteria for an empirically supported treatment, but did
acknowledge that the evidence base was still young and showed some promise.
Conditions including depression, anxiety disorders, psychosis, substance abuse,
chronic medical illness, eating disorders, chronic pain, and work-related stress, have
all been investigated within the ACT literature (Hayes, Masuda et al., 2004).
However, although the scope of the empirical literature is wide-ranging, currently
research in any one of these individual areas remains limited (Hayes, Masuda et al.,
2004).
ACT has been shown to result in improvements in a range of psychological outcomes,
and in addition some studies have shown that the mechanisms of change are
consistent with the underlying ACT model and are distinct from alternative treatments
(Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes, Masuda et al., 2004). In chronic pain, ACT has been
found to result in significant improvements in a number of outcomes and increased
acceptance of pain appears to be the primary process responsible for this improved
functioning (McCracken, Vowles & Eccleston, 2005). Further, Bond and Bunce
(2000) found that an ACT intervention in a work-place setting significantly improved
employees' general psychological health and that rather than being the result of
changes in dysfunctional cognitive content, it was psychological acceptance that
mediated the beneficial outcomes of the ACT intervention.
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A study by Zettle and Hayes (1987) is one of a small number that have directly
compared ACT and cognitive therapy. This study found that ACT was superior to
cognitive therapy on reducing depression post-treatment. Although the two groups did
not differ significantly on the frequency of depressive thoughts, individuals in the
ACT group reported a reduction in the believability of these thoughts. This is an
extremely preliminary study, with only a small sample size, therefore firm
conclusions cannot really be drawn on the basis of this data. However, it is a useful
study to highlight, because not only does it suggest ACT may be as effective as
cognitive therapy, but also that it may be working through different processes than
direct cognitive change strategies (Hayes et al., 2006).
Further research is needed to more fully investigate the empirical status of ACT. In
particular, many of the studies have employed relatively short and limited ACT
interventions (Hayes et al., 2006) and investigation ofmore comprehensive treatment
packages would be beneficial to the literature. In addition, some aspects of the ACT
model have so far received little empirical investigation (Hayes et al., 2006) and
therefore further research in these areas would add to our understanding of the
mechanisms of change. Ost (2008) also recommends that future ACT research should
include comparisons with CBT for some of the most common psychiatric disorders.
Although the evidence base for ACT is still in its early stages, and methodological
limitations prevent firm conclusions being drawn from some of the studies, it does
appear a promising approach that may be useful in the treatment of a variety of
disorders. In their review paper, Hayes et al. (2006) conclude that ACT 'seems so far
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to be working across an unusually broad range of problems, and across a range of
severity' (p.21).
1.4.4.4 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy with psychosis
To date, two randomised controlled trials have been carried out investigating the
application of ACT to individuals with psychosis, and although both have been
limited in terms ofmethodology, they report surprisingly powerful outcomes.
Bach and Hayes (2002) compared a brief, four-session intervention of ACT, with a
treatment as usual control group, in a sample of 80 inpatients with positive psychotic
symptoms. This study found that patients in the ACT group had half the rate of re-
hospitalisation over a follow-up period of four months. However, this study also
found an increase in self-reported symptoms amongst patients in the ACT group, but
found that these symptoms were rated as less believable. Bach and Hayes suggest that
the increase in reported symptoms could reflect increased acceptance, and therefore
individuals were more likely to acknowledge rather than deny the presence of
symptoms. The decreased believability has been proposed to result from increased
cognitive defusion, and has also been found in other studies investigating ACT (Zettle
& Hayes, 1987). However, a limitation of this study is the lack of standardised
outcome measures relating to psychological factors. The re-hospitalisation data were
considered the primary outcome measure, and data regarding the frequency,
believability and distress of psychotic symptoms were collected through oral
questioning to participants as opposed to standardised measures.
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Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) replicated the Bach and Hayes (2002) study using a
smaller sample size but including a wider range of outcome measures. Their results
found that, compared to an enhanced treatment as usual condition (ETAU),
participants who received ACT showed overall greater symptom improvement,
including superiority on measures of affective severity, distress associated with
hallucinations, and social functioning. Similarly to the Bach and Hayes study, they
also found that individuals in the ACT group reported a decrease in the believability
of hallucinations, which was not evident in individuals in the ETAU condition. This
decrease in believability was also found to be associated with decreased distress, even
after controlling for differences in symptom frequency.
Additionally, Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) found that ACT resulted in a 38%
reduction in re-hospitalisation rates after four months, relative to ETAU, which is
comparable to the 50% reduction that was found by Bach and Hayes (2002).
However, the differences in re-hospitalisation rates between the two treatment groups
in the Gaudiano and Herbert study did not reach statistical significance in their
analysis. Unfortunately, the small sample size of their study meant that it was
underpowered to statistically detect some of the more modest between-group
differences, which is a significant limitation of the study.
Despite methodological limitations, findings from both these studies suggest that
ACT is a promising therapeutic approach for individuals with psychosis. Further
controlled research using larger samples is necessary and examination of the
mechanisms of change would also be beneficial, especially as neither Bach and Hayes
(2002) or Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) directly measured levels of acceptance. The
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Voices Acceptance and Action Scale (VAAS) (Shawyer et al., 2007) has recently
been developed to assess acceptance-based attitudes and actions in relation to auditory
and command hallucinations. Although only preliminary results on the reliability and
validity of this measure exist, it shows promise as a useful aid in assessing acceptance
of auditory hallucinations in relation to the processes of change in ACT interventions.
Initial results from the evaluation of this measure suggest acceptance of auditory
hallucinations is negatively correlated with depression and positively related to
quality of life (Shawyer et al., 2007). Furthermore, acceptance was not found to be
related to severity of auditory hallucinations, indicating that it is not only those with
less severe symptoms that accept their voices (Shawyer et al., 2007).
1.4.5 Summary
Acceptance-based approaches aim to change the way individuals relate to difficult or
negatively evaluated internal experiences. Rather than changing the form or frequency
of thoughts, feelings or images, acceptance-based approaches aim to alter the function
of such experiences, and the contexts in which they arise. Techniques such as
mindfulness, acceptance and cognitive defusion are utilised within these approaches.
Individuals are encouraged to move to a context of deliteralisation. in which internal
experiences are viewed for what they are and not necessarily taken to be true
interpretations of the experience.
Experiential avoidance is viewed as the opposite of psychological acceptance, and has
been described as an unwillingness to remain in contact with internal experiences. It
involves persistent attempts to alter the form or frequency of these experiences or the
contexts that lead to them. Experiential avoidance has been associated with the
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development and maintenance of psychological distress and general psychopathology
in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Although often a seeming positive strategy
in the short-term, experiential avoidance is thought to paradoxically increase the
severity of these internal experiences in the long-term, thus maintaining or
exacerbating psychological difficulties and distress, and leading to further avoidance.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is an example of an acceptance-based
psychological approach, and has been empirically investigated within psychosis
populations. The aim of ACT is to increase psychological flexibility through the use
of acceptance and mindfulness strategies, together with commitment and behaviour
change strategies. Experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion are viewed as key
processes preventing psychological flexibility. The ultimate aim of psychological
flexibility is to allow individuals to engage in valued behaviours despite difficult or
aversive internal experiences.
The evidence base for ACT is still in its infancy, however there is growing evidence
to suggest that it may be an effective intervention for a wide range of disorders,
including psychosis. The research base is promising and some studies have shown
that the mechanisms through which ACT works may be distinct from alternative




This study aims to explore factors associated with psychological distress in
individuals who have experienced psychosis. It aims to explore the relationships
between self-schema, illness beliefs, and experiential avoidance, and to investigate the
influence of each of these factors on psychological distress. It is hypothesised that
experiential avoidance will mediate both the relationship between self-schema and
distress, and between illness beliefs and distress, which if confirmed may support the
use of acceptance-based interventions, such as ACT, with this client group.
1.5.2 Research question
How are self-schema, illness beliefs and experiential avoidance related to
psychological distress in individuals with psychosis?
1.5.3 Hypotheses
i. Negative self-schema will be associated with negative illness beliefs.
ii. Negative self-schema and negative illness beliefs will be associated with
greater experiential avoidance.
iii. Negative self-schema, negative illness beliefs and high experiential avoidance
will be associated with greater psychological distress.
iv. Experiential avoidance will mediate the relationship between negative self-
schema and psychological distress.





A cross-sectional, quantitative design was employed to address the research questions
outlined.
This study forms part of a collaborative research design, in which data were collected
for the purposes of two concurrent research studies. A battery of six measures were
administered to all participants, data from four of the measures are analysed in the
current study and data from the remaining two measures are analysed and reported
elsewhere in a separate research study (Weinberg, 2008). This collaborative design
was adopted due to the overlap in the use of two of the measures in addressing the
separate research questions, and in order to maximise the sample size that could be
acquired for both research projects.
2.2 Power analysis
A prospective power analysis was carried out in order to establish the number of
participants required in this study to achieve the recommended power level of .80
(Clark-Carter, 2004; Cohen, 1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and alpha level of .05
(Cohen, 1992; Green, 1991). A medium effect size was considered to be of interest in
the analysis of these data. No previous study had carried out a similar analysis with
these variables, therefore, the decision to use a medium effect size was based on
studies which had examined correlations between these, or similar, variables. In
samples of individuals with psychosis, medium to large effect sizes were found on
correlations between measures of depression and measures of negative self-schema
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(Smith et al., 2006), and illness beliefs (Watson et al., 2006). No studies were found
that had used the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) with this population,
but correlations of this measure with depression in other clinical populations have
found a medium to large effect size (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004). In addition,
a recent study on the initial scale development of the Voices Acceptance and Action
Scale (VAAS), a measure of acceptance-based attitudes and responses to auditory
hallucinations, found a large effect size between this measure and depression in a
sample of individuals with psychosis (Shawyer et al., 2007).
Path analysis was chosen as the most appropriate technique for analysing these data
and addressing the research questions outlined. Path analysis involves a series of
multiple regression analyses to test predicted relationships between variables.
There are several different methods for determining the number of participants
required in multiple regression analyses. Harris (1985) proposes the following
equation to calculate sample size: N > 50 + m (where m = number ofpredictor
variables). There are three predictor variables in the current study therefore,
according to Harris' equation a sample size of 53 would be required. Cohen (1992)
states that 76 participants would be required for a multiple regression analysis with 3
individual predictors. Green (1991) advocates a more conservative formula of N > 50
+ 8m for testing the overall fit of a regression model and N > 104 + m for testing the
individual predictor variables within a regression model. Using Green's formulae, the
current study would need 74 participants to examine the overall fit of the regression
model and 107 participants to test individual predictors. If a study is interested in both
the overall fit of a model and the contribution of individual predictors within it. it is
50
recommended that sample size is calculated using both methods and the largest value
used (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Based on the above parameters and formulae, it was established that it would be
optimal to have a minimum of 76 participants in the study, which was the figure
suggested by Cohen's equation (1992), and is close to the mean of the different
estimations.
2.3 Participants
All participants in this study were individuals who had experienced psychotic
symptoms (delusions, hallucinations or other severe thought disturbances). A
definitive diagnosis was not necessary for individuals to be included in the study and
it was not necessary for individuals to be currently experiencing active psychotic
symptoms.
Participants were recruited from NHS and voluntary agency mental health services
within the geographical areas of Forth Valley and Fife. Participants were recruited
from both outpatient and inpatient services, including Community Mental Health
Teams (CMHTs), Community Rehabilitation Teams (CRTs), outreach teams,
psychiatric inpatient units (acute and rehabilitation), and voluntary support
organisations.
Potential participants were identified by their keyworker or psychiatrist based on the
inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in Table 1.
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Table 1: Participant inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Individuals who have experienced
psychotic symptoms (delusions,
hallucinations or other severe thought
disturbances).
Individuals, who in the opinion oftheir
psychiatrist or keyworker, would be
unable to provide informed consent.
Individuals attending NHS or
voluntary agency mental health
services within the geographical areas
of Forth Valley or Fife.
Individuals, who in the opinion oftheir
psychiatrist or keyworker, are currently
too distressed, or likely to become too
distressed, by participation in the
study.
Individuals aged 18 years or older. Individuals under 18 years of age.
2.4 Measures
This study adopted a self-report, quantitative methodology. Six measures were
administered to all participants, but as previously outlined only four are analysed in
the current study.
2.4.1 Reliability of using self-reportmeasures
It has been argued that individuals with psychosis may not have the ability to provide
valid and reliable self-report data (Atkinson, Zibin & Chuang, 1997; Cramer et al.,
2000; Melle et al., 2005). Cognitive impairments, lack of insight, denial, unstable
mental state, distractibility and interference from psychotic symptoms, have all been
suggested as reasons behind the supposed unreliability of self-report measures with
this population (Amador et al, 1993; Huppert, Smith & Apfeldorf, 2002; Melle et al.,
2005; Wetzler & Marlowe, 1993). However, studies have shown that reliable and
valid information about a range of areas, including current psychotic symptoms.
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anxiety, depression, and quality of life, can be obtained by administering self-report
measures to individuals diagnosed with psychotic disorders (Huppert et al., 2002;
Khatri, Romney & Pelletier, 2001; Liraud, Droulout, Parrot & Verdoux, 2004;
Voruganti, Heslegrave, Awad & Seeman, 1998).
Self-report measures provide unique information that is not accessible from other
methods, such as clinical ratings (Wetzler & Marlowe, 1993). It is also increasingly
recognised that an essential part of developing understanding of psychotic experiences
is through exploring the views and beliefs of individuals experiencing these
symptoms. Therefore, utilising a self-report methodology with this population was
viewed as both appropriate and important.
2.4.2 Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS)
The Brief Core Schema Scales (Fowler et al., 2006) (Appendix 1) provide a self-
report assessment of schemata concerning self and others in psychosis. It is a 24-item
questionnaire that assesses 4 dimensions of self and other evaluation (negative self;
positive self; negative other; and positive other). There are 6 items in each of the 4
dimensions and individuals are asked to indicate if they hold each of the 24 beliefs,
and if so, to rate how strongly they hold each belief on a 4-point scale (from 1 -believe
it slightly to 4—believe it totally). It is a quick and easily administered measure and is
currently the only existing scale that assesses positive evaluations of self and others in
combination with negative evaluations of self and others (Fowler et al., 2006).
The BCSS demonstrate good internal reliability in both clinical and non-clinical
samples, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranging from .78 to .88 (Fowler et al.,
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2006). In addition, test-retest reliability in a non-clinical sample tested three weeks
apart, ranged from .70 to .84 for each of the four scales (Fowler et al., 2006). A
principal components analysis suggested a four-component solution to the underlying
dimensional structure, which reflects independence between the different dimensions
of self and other evaluation (Fowler et al., 2006).
The BCSS shows good construct validity, and has demonstrated moderate to strong
associations with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the
defectiveness/shame, mistrust/abuse and social isolation subscales of Young's
Schema Questionnaire-Short Form (Young, 1998) (Fowler et al., 2006). The scales
also show a degree of independence from mood, which is highlighted as being greater
than that of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Fowler et al., 2006).
2.4.3 Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised (PBIQ-R)
The Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised (Birchwood, Mason,
MacMillan & Healy, 1993) (Appendix 1) is a 29-item self-report questionnaire that
assesses participants' cognitive appraisal of their psychotic illness. Participants'
beliefs are assessed in 5 domains: entrapment which includes six items and assesses
the extent to which a person feels their illness prevents them from doing things and
moving on with their life; shame which includes six items and assesses the extent to
which an individual feels ashamed by their illness or feels others view them
negatively because of their illness; loss which includes seven items and assesses the
extent to which a person feels that certain areas of their life have changed for the
worse because of their illness; group fit which includes five items and assesses the
extent to which a person feels socially excluded by their illness; and control over
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illness which includes five items and assesses the extent to which a person feels they
have control over their illness. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale ranging
from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Higher scores on all subscales represent
greater negative appraisals of the psychotic experience. For the purposes of this study
each of these subscales will be summed in order to provide a global measure of
beliefs about psychosis.
Internal reliability for the original PBIQ ranged from .51 to .71 across the different
subscales, and test-retest reliability ranged from .77 to 1.00 (Birchwood et al., 1993).
The PBIQ-R is an extended and revised version of the original 16-item PBIQ.
Psychometric data regarding the PBIQ-R is currently unpublished, but the measure
has been recommended as a more reliable measure by the main author (M.Birchwood,
personal communication, 21 November 2007).
2.4.4 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-ll (AAQ-II)
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (Bond et al., 2008) (Appendix 1) is a 10-
item self-report measure of experiential avoidance. The AAQ-II is a revised version
of the original AAQ-I developed by Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004. Items on the
AAQ measure various aspects of the experiential avoidance concept, including need
for emotional and cognitive control, avoidance of negative private events, inability to
take needed action in the face of private events, and forms of cognitive entanglement,
such as excessively negative evaluations of private experiences or negative self
references (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004). Items are rated on a 7-point scale
from 'never true' to 'always true'. All items load onto a single factor (F.Bond,
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personal communication, 29 January 2008), with higher scores on this scale
representing greater experiential avoidance and less psychological flexibility.
The development of the AAQ-II was primarily to address the reliability problems of
the original AAQ-I in some populations (F.Bond, personal communication, 29
January 2008). The AAQ-II correlates highly with the original AAQ-I (r = .82; Bond
et al., 2008). The AAQ-II has been shown to have consistently good internal
reliability across seven samples with a total of nearly 3,300 participants, with a mean
Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .83 (range .76 to .87) (Bond et al., 2008). The scale
has also demonstrated good test-retest reliability, with a Pearson's correlation
coefficient of .80 for three-month follow-up, and .78 for 12-month follow-up (Bond et
al., 2008).
The AAQ-II demonstrates good validity, and has been shown to longitudinally predict
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987) and General
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1978) (F.Bond, personal communication, 18 June
2007 and 29 January 2008). Confirmatory factor analysis models indicate that the
AAQ-II is measuring a construct that is distinct from depression, anxiety or general
mental health (F.Bond, personal communication, 29 January 2008).
2.4.5 Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation outcome measure
(CORE)
The Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation outcome measure (Evans et al., 1998)
(Appendix 1) is a 34-item self-report measure that assesses distress across 3
dimensions: subjective well-being; commonly experienced problems or symptoms;
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and life/social functioning. In addition to these three dimensions it also includes items
that assess risk to self and to others. Individuals are asked to rate each item depending
on how often they have felt like this over the previous week. Items are scored on a 5-
point scale ranging from 'not at all' to 'most or all of the time'. The total score acts as
a global index of distress, however scores for each of the dimensions can also be used
separately where required.
The scale has been found to have good internal reliability when assessed in both
clinical and non-clinical samples. Cronbach's alpha coefficient for individual
subscales and global score has been shown to range from 0.75 to 0.94 (Evans et al.,
2002). Its validity has also been established in a number of studies (Barkham et al.,
2001; Evans et al., 2002; Evans et al., 2000). The CORE has been found to correlate
highly with other measures of psychological distress such as, the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression
(HRSD; Hamilton, 1967), and the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer,
1988) (Cahill et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006).
2.4.6 Othermeasures
The Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens & Roberts, 2002)
and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier
& Faragher, 1999) were also administered to all participants, but data from these were
analysed separately as part of a different research study.
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2.5 Procedure
Participants were recruited from NHS or voluntary agency mental health services
within the geographical areas of Forth Valley and Fife. Potential participants were
identified through their keyworker or psychiatrist (based on the inclusion and
exclusion criteria outlined in Table 1), and were provided with a written information
sheet about the study (Appendix 2). All potential participants were given a minimum
of 24 hours to consider the information before being contacted directly by the
researcher to ask whether they wished to participate.
If individuals were agreeable to taking part in the research, a mutually convenient
meeting time was arranged between participant and researcher. Researchers met with
participants at either an NHS clinic or inpatient location; at a voluntary agency
location; or where this was not possible, and where appropriate, a home visit was
arranged. All referral forms (Appendix 3) included a question regarding whether there
were any risk factors regarding a lone home visit with the referred participant, and in
all home visit situations the researcher adhered to the NHS lone working protocol of
either NHS Forth Valley or NHS Fife.
A standard procedure was followed in the meetings between researcher and
participant. This was considered particularly important since the data were collected
by two different researchers. All participants were firstly offered the chance to re-read
a copy of the information sheet and ask any questions they may have about the study.
Participants were informed that all information they provided would be confidential.
However, it was also verbally explained to participants that if the researcher had any
concerns about the participant's risk to self or others, or their well-being as a result of
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taking part in this study, then this would need to be fed back to their keyworker or
psychiatrist. If participants were happy to continue after this, then they were asked to
sign a consent form (Appendix 4), and some basic demographic information regarding
the participant was recorded. This information included date of birth, gender,
diagnosis (if known), whether they were currently an inpatient (due to mental health
problems) and number of previous psychiatric hospitalisations (ifapplicable).
Before completing the measures it was verbally explained to participants that
participation was entirely voluntary and they were free to withdraw from the study at
any time without penalty, or to take a break if required. They were also informed that
there were no right or wrong answers to any of the questions and participants were
simply to answer questions based on their own feelings and beliefs. The six measures
were then administered in a standard order (see Table 2).
Table 2: Standard order that measures were administered.
Order Measure
1 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II)
2 Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS)
3 Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS)
4 Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised (PBIQ-R)
5 Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE)
6 Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ)
With the exception of the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales, all measures could be
completed by the participant themselves, independent of the researcher. However, in
all cases the researcher remained in the same room as the participant while the
measures were being completed, to ensure measures were completed appropriately
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and in case the participant had any questions. However, if the participant indicated a
preference for the researcher to read the measures aloud to them, or to complete the
measures with them, then this was carried out and it was recorded that the measures
had been administered in this way. The time taken for participants to complete all of
the measures was also recorded.
Each participant's psychiatrist was informed in writing that the individual had
participated in the study. Participants were also offered the opportunity to receive a
summary of the research findings once completed.
2.6 Participant confidentiality
Each participant was assigned an identification number, which was used to code all of
the measures so that participant names or identifying information were not attached to
any of their questionnaire responses. No identifying information was included in any
computer databases or stored electronically. All participant information, consent
forms and questionnaires were stored in a locked filing cabinet within the psychology
department of either NHS Forth Valley or NHS Fife.
2.7 Ethical issues
Individuals with psychosis represent a vulnerable population, and the experience of
psychotic symptoms is often associated with cognitive and emotional impairments.
Due to this, a number of ethical considerations were taken into account when planning
this study, in particular whether participation in the study would excessively burden
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individuals, or cause them to become distressed, and whether participants would have
capacity to consent to participation.
To reduce any potential burden on participants, measures were selected that covered
the relevant areas that the research was investigating, whilst being relatively quick to
complete. Participants were encouraged to take their time completing measures and
were offered breaks if necessary.
Due to the nature of some of the questions in this research, which require participants
to reflect on their experiences of psychosis, it was considered possible that some
individuals may become distressed as a result of taking part in the study. Participants
were advised before opting-in to the study, that they could refuse to answer any
questions they found sensitive or upsetting, and could also withdraw from the study at
any time. In the event that any participant experienced distress as a result of taking
part in the study, then it was agreed that the researcher would contact the individual's
keyworker or other relevant health care professional so that the participant could be
offered additional support to help alleviate their distress. This was made explicit to all
participants before they consented to take part in the study. It was also made clear to
all participants before they opted-in to the study, that should the researcher have any
concerns regarding the participants risk to self or risk to others, then this information
would be passed onto their keyworker or psychiatrist.
Given the vulnerabilities and impairments associated with individuals with psychosis,
it was considered important to keep all information as clear and simple as possible,
whilst at the same time ensuring that participants had a full understanding of the study
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and what was expected of them. In order to give participants the opportunity to
consider the information about the study and make an informed decision about
whether they wished to participate, a minimum of 24 hours was given to each
participant from receiving the information sheet about the study to being asked to opt-
in. In addition to receiving a written participant information sheet, which was kept as
clear and simple as possible, all participants were offered an additional verbal
explanation for the study by the researcher and given the opportunity to ask questions.
2.7.1 Ethical approval
The proposal for this research was reviewed by the Tayside Committee on Medical
Research Ethics A, part of the Fife, Forth Valley and Tayside NHS Research Ethics
Service. After reviewing this proposal, this committee granted approval for this
research study to be carried out (Appendix 5). Approval was also granted from the





Data were collected from 84 participants, 42 of whom were female and 42 male. The
age range of participants was 21 to 71 years and the mean age was 43 years (SD =
12.15). All participants had experienced psychotic symptoms, and information
regarding diagnoses were collected from the participants themselves and from the
referral forms, which were usually completed by the participant's keyworker or
psychiatrist. These diagnoses were not checked against participant's medical case
notes. In situations where the participant's view of their diagnosis differed from that
of their referrer, then the diagnosis as stated by the referrer was reported. The most
common diagnosis amongst the sample was schizophrenia, which was reported in
53.5% of cases (n=45), and this included diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia, which
accounted for 7.1% (n=6) of this figure. Additional diagnoses within the sample
included bipolar affective disorder (23.8%; n=20), schizoaffective disorder (6%; n=5),
delusional disorder (2.4%; n=2), psychotic depression (1.2%; n=l) and borderline
personality disorder (1.2%; n=l). A general diagnosis of psychosis was reported for
3.6% (n=3) of participants and diagnoses were unknown in 8.3% (n=7) of the sample.
Data were collected from the geographical areas of Forth Valley and Fife, and exactly
50% (n=42) of participants were recruited from each area. Information on current
inpatient status and previous psychiatric admissions was also recorded. Within the
sample, 39.3% (n=33) were inpatients within psychiatric wards at the time of
participating in the study, and the remaining 60.7% (n=51) were referrals from
outpatient services. Five participants (5.95%) had no history of psychiatric
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admissions, 11 had one previous admission (13.1%), 45 had between two and five
previous admissions (53.57%) and 23 had six or more previous psychiatric admissions
(27.38%).
The mean length of time to complete the measures was 32 minutes (SD = 11.65), and
47.6% (n = 40) of participants self-completed the measures, although the researcher
was present during completion. The remaining 52.4% of the sample requested
assistance with completing the measures, and this primarily consisted of the
researcher reading the questions aloud to participants.
3.2 Statistical Analyses
Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
Version 14.0 for Windows. There were no missing data.
3.2.1 Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses were carried out to evaluate the data against the assumptions of
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption
in regression analyses, that the residuals at each level of the predictor variables will
have similar variance (Field, 2005). For grouped data, as opposed to regression




Normality of the variables was assessed through examination of histograms, and also
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test. Results from the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test indicated that one of the predictor variables (BCSS - Negative self
subscale) and the outcome variable (CORE) were non-normally distributed (p<.05).
However, Field (2005) suggests that significance on this test does not necessarily
indicate whether this deviation from normality is large enough to bias statistical
analyses. Therefore, data were analysed further by assessing the degree of skewness
and kurtosis present, two key components of normality. In order to standardise the
reported values for skewness and kurtosis, they were converted into z-scores, using
the following formulae:
S K
Zskewness = Zkurtosis =
^tSkewness ^tkurtosis
Where S is the reported value for skewness, K is the reported value for kurtosis, and
SE is the standard error (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Field (2005)
suggests that z-scores greater than 2.58 for both skewness and kurtosis should be
considered significant at p<.01. Analysis of the data using these formulae revealed
that significant kurtosis was not present in any of the variables in this study, however,
one of the predictor variables (BCSS - Negative self subscale) was found to have
significant positive skewness (z = 3.29, p<0.01).
3.2.1.2 Data transformation
Data transformations are recommended in cases where the assumption of normality is
violated (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The aim of data transformation is to reduce the
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impact of extreme scores, whilst preserving the relationships between them.
Relationships between scores are not altered as a result of data transformation, since
the same transformation is carried out on each of the values within a variable (Field,
2005).
The three most common types of data transformation are log, square root, and
reciprocal. Log transformation involves taking the logarithm of a set of values. Log
transformations are a good way of reducing positive skew in a data set, as they
compress the right tail of the distribution more than the left (Field, 2005). Square root
transformations involve taking the square root of each score. Taking the square root of
larger values has more of an effect than smaller values therefore, by transforming data
in this way, any large scores will be brought closer to the centre of the distribution
(Field, 2005). Reciprocal transformation involves dividing one by each score, thereby
reducing the impact of large scores. Transforming data in this way reverses scores, so
that what were large values originally, become small values after transformation and
vice versa (Field, 2005).
Log, square root and reciprocal transformations were carried out on the two variables
in the current study found to have non-normal distribution (BCSS - Negative self
subscale and the CORE). In both cases square root transformation resulted in the most
improvements in normality. Although in the case of the BCSS, the square root
transformation, despite improving the normality of the data, still did not result in non-
significance on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p<.05). However, the transformed data
did result in both non-significant skewness and kurtosis (p>.01).
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3.2.1.3 Linearity, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and residuals
Linearity was assessed through examination of scatterplots for each pair of variables.
From examination of these, it appeared that all variables were linearly related.
Screening of the residuals produced by the regression analyses, including examination
of normal probability plots and scatterplots, were also carried out to assess for
homoscedasticity, outliers, and multicollinearity. Residuals were examined following
regression analyses using both the untransformed and transformed data. This is
recommended in order to ensure that the transformation of data does not then produce
difficulties or problems in a different area (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). In
all cases the assumption of homoscedasticity appeared to have been met, and
multicollinearity was not present in any of the analyses. Outliers were identified
through examination of boxplots, normal probability plots and z-scores. Tabachnick
and Fidell (2001) suggest that cases with z-scores in excess of 3.29 (p<.001) should
be considered potential outliers. In all residual analyses, no cases exceeded this
standardised score, therefore there was no reason to suggest that data were unduly
biased by any outlying cases.
As outlined above, regression analyses were carried out using both transformed and
untransformed data, and comparison of the two sets of results revealed very little
differences. Therefore, it can be assumed that violation of the assumption of normality
in these data was unlikely to bias statistical analyses. Indeed, Allison (1999) states
that the assumption of normality is the least important of all assumptions in multiple
regression, and given a moderate sample size can be dispensed with entirely.
However, given that the square root data transformation in this study resulted in
significant improvements in the normality of two variables, and examination of the
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residuals indicated that this transformation was without negative impact on any of the
other assumptions, it was decided that the transformed data would be reported in the
statistical analyses.
3.2.2 Descriptive data
Descriptive data regarding the four variables are included in Table 3. For the purpose
of presenting descriptive statistics, the untransformed data are reported. This was
done to facilitate interpretation and enhance clarity of comparison with other
published data using these measures. However, for the correlation and regression
analyses, the transformed data for the BCSS and the CORE are utilised. The mean
scores for each of the variables are presented along with the standard deviation and
minimum and maximum scores obtained from the sample. The possible range of
scores that could be obtained on each of the measures is also included in this table.










Scales - Negative self
subscale (BCSS-NS)












42.89 25.06 2 102 0-136
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Total scores for the Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised (PBIQ-R)
and the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE) are used for the purposes of
addressing the research hypotheses outlined. However, both of these measures can be
broken down into various individual subscales (as outlined in sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.5)
and descriptive data for each of these subscales are presented in Table 4. Data
regarding the remaining three subscales of the Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS) are
also presented in Table 4.











15.15 3.85 6 23 6-24
PBIQ-R
Shame subscale
14.65 3.44 6 22 6-24
PBIQ-R
Loss subscale
17.82 4.04 7 25 7-28
PBIQ-R
Group fit subscale




12.45 3.30 5 20 5-20
CORE
Well-being subscale








16.89 8.99 0 41 0-48
CORE
Risk subscale
1.86 2.71 0 10 0-24
BCSS - Positive self
subscale (BCSS-PS)








11.04 5.38 1 24 0-24
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3.2.3 Bivariate Correlations
Hypotheses 1 to 3 were assessed using Pearson product-moment correlations. A
correlation matrix is presented in Table 5, with Pearson correlation coefficients (r)
reported for each pair of variables, along with significance levels. As outlined
previously, in these and all further statistical analyses, the square root transformed
data for the variables of BCSS - Negative self and the CORE have been used.



















Hypothesis 1: Negative self-schema will be associated with negative illness beliefs.
The data shows that a significant positive relationship exists between negative self-
schema and illness beliefs (r = .73. p (one-tailed) <.001), therefore, hypothesis 1 is
supported.
Hypothesis 2: Negative self-schema and negative illness beliefs will be associated
with greater experiential avoidance.
Experiential avoidance was significantly correlated with negative self-schema (r =
.66, p (one-tailed) <.001) and illness beliefs (r = .77, p (one-tailed) <.001). Both of
70
these correlations were positive, indicating higher scores on one variable was
associated with higher scores on the other, therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported.
Hypothesis 3: Negative self-schema, negative illness beliefs, and high experiential
avoidance will be associated with greater psychological distress.
Psychological distress was significantly correlated with negative self-schema (r = .71,
p (one-tailed) <.001), illness beliefs (r = .77, p (one-tailed) <.001), and experiential
avoidance (r = .83, p (one-tailed) <.001). All correlations were positive, thereby
confirming hypothesis 3.
3.2.4 Path analysis
Path analysis was used to assess hypotheses 4 and 5. Path analysis is an extension of
multiple regression, and allows variables to act as both independent and dependent
variables (Norman & Steiner, 1998). It provides information regarding the strength of
relationships between variables, and can be used to analyse and compare direct and
indirect effects (Allison, 1999).
In this study, path analysis was carried out using a series of standard multiple
regression analyses in SPSS. This method of carrying out path analysis has been
outlined by a number of authors (Bramwell, 1996; Cramer, 2003; Frazier, Tix &
Barron, 2004). Three multiple regression analyses were carried out, and the results
from each of these are presented in Table 6.
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PBIQ-R BCSS-NS 9.29 .97 .73 9.61 .000
Regression 2
Outcome variable =
AAQ-II BCSS-NS 2.91 1.36 .22 2.14 .035
PBIQ-R .64 .11 .61 6.04 .000
Regression 3
Outcome variable =
CORE BCSS-NS .35 .14 .21 2.46 .016
PBIQ-R .03 .01 .21 2.18 .032
AAQ-II .07 .01 .53 5.89 .000
Regression 1: R2 = .53, adj R2 = .52, F (1, 83) = 92.31, p <.001
Regression 2: R2 = .61, adj R2 = .60, F (2, 83) = 63.66, p <.001
Regression 3: R2 = .75, adj R2 = .74, F (3, 83) = 79.76, p <.001
Figure 1 shows the path model used to assess hypotheses 4 and 5. The path
coefficients along each pathway are the standardised beta coefficients (P) obtained
from the multiple regression analyses (Bramwell, 1996). These coefficients indicate
the strength of the relationship between variables. Statistical significance of each of
the path coefficients is indicated by the use of asterisks. Error terms (e) were also
determined for each regression analysis within the path model, and these were
calculated by taking the square root of 1 - R" (Bramwell, 1996). Error terms provide
an indication of the success of the model, as they represent how much of the variance
within the model remains unexplained after the regression analyses have been carried








e = error term
e = .68
Figure 1: Path diagram of the relationships between negative self-schema,
illness beliefs, experiential avoidance and psychological distress, showing
path coefficients and error terms.
The path coefficients represent the strength of relationship between each pair of
variables. However, in path analysis the indirect pathways between variables are also
of interest, and these can be calculated by multiplying the path coefficients along each
of the paths between the relevant variables (Bramwell, 1996). Hypotheses 4 and 5
propose that experiential avoidance will act as a mediator variable within the model.
A mediator variable can be described as one that explains the relationship between a
predictor (independent) and outcome (dependent) variable (Frazier et al., 2004).
Therefore, to examine these hypotheses the strength of the indirect pathways through
experiential avoidance will be calculated and compared to the strength of direct
relationships within the model.
73
Hypothesis 4: Experiential avoidance will mediate the relationship between negative
self-schema andpsychological distress.
In order to assess support for this hypothesis, the strength of the direct pathway
between negative self-schema and psychological distress will be compared to the
indirect pathway through experiential avoidance. This indirect pathway can be
calculated by multiplying the path coefficient between negative self-schema and
experiential avoidance (.22) by the path coefficient between experiential avoidance
and distress (.53). Thus, the strength of the indirect pathway is calculated as .12.
However, the direct pathway between negative self-schema and psychological distress
is .21. Therefore, the hypothesis that experiential avoidance mediates the relationship
between negative self-schema and psychological distress is not supported by this data.
Hypothesis 5: Experiential avoidance will mediate the relationship between illness
beliefs andpsychological distress.
Similarly, hypothesis 5 was assessed by comparing the strength of the direct pathway
between illness beliefs and psychological distress, with the indirect pathway through
experiential avoidance. The indirect pathway was calculated by multiplying the path
coefficient between illness beliefs and experiential avoidance (.61) by the path
coefficient between experiential avoidance and psychological distress (.53). Thus, the
strength of the indirect pathway is calculated as .32. The strength of the direct
pathway between illness beliefs and psychological distress is .21. These data lend
partial support to the hypothesis that experiential avoidance mediates the relationship
between illness beliefs and psychological distress. The hypothesis is only partially
supported since the direct pathway between illness beliefs and psychological distress
is also significant.
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3.2.4.1 Success of the path model
By examining the error variance within the path model, the overall success of the
model can be assessed. As outlined previously, error terms provide an indication of
how much of the variance within the variables remains unexplained by the
hypothesised relationships in the model (Bramwell, 1996). The error term may
represent different types of error, such as error arising from measurement of the
variables or general model error, including omission of relevant variables or incorrect
ordering of factors within the model (Bramwell, 1996). Error variance is usually
considered high if it is above .80 (Bramwell, 1996).
Figure 1 shows that within the model presented in the current study, all error terms are
less than .70, thus indicating moderate error variance. This suggests that the model is
relatively successful in accounting for the variance between the variables. The error
term is lowest for the regression analysis of negative self-schema, illness beliefs and
experiential avoidance onto distress (e = .50). This indicates that these three variables
can be considered to account for 50% of the variance in distress within this sample.
Additionally, error terms indicate negative self-schema can be considered to account
for 32% of the variance in illness beliefs (e = .68), and illness beliefs and negative
self-schema together can be considered to account for 38% of the variance in
experiential avoidance (e = .62).
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4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Summary and interpretation of findings
The aim of the present study was to explore factors associated with psychological
distress in a sample of individuals who had experienced psychosis. The psychological
factors investigated were schemas, illness beliefs and experiential avoidance. The
influence of each of these factors on distress, and the interrelationships between them
were examined.
Pearson product-moment correlations showed that there were significant positive
correlations between all four variables in the study. Each variable was scored in the
same direction, so that high scores indicated dysfunction, or negative responses. Thus,
the significant positive correlations indicate that a high score on any one of the
variables is likely to be associated with a high score on another.
The current study hypothesised that negative self-schema would be associated with
negative illness beliefs, and that high scores on both these factors would be associated
with greater experiential avoidance. In addition, it was hypothesised that negative
self-schema, negative illness beliefs and high experiential avoidance would all be
associated with increased distress. The significant, positive correlations found
between the variables therefore provide support for each of these first three
hypotheses.
Indirect and direct relationships between all four of the variables were tested using
path analysis. A model of the hypothesised relationships was presented and then
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tested as to its goodness of fit with the data. The model presented was based on
previous research findings and an underlying theoretical rationale. Data demonstrated
a number of significant direct and indirect relationships between the variables. As
with the correlations, all relationships within the model were positive. Overall, the
model was considered relatively successful in accounting for variance in the variables,
as all error terms were <.70. Specifically, the three variables of negative self-schema,
illness beliefs and experiential avoidance were found to account for a significant
proportion of the variance in distress (50%; e = .50). This suggests that the proposed
model was successful in highlighting three important psychological factors in
explaining distress amongst individuals with psychosis.
Negative self-schema, illness beliefs and experiential avoidance were all found to
directly contribute to the variance in psychological distress. The strongest direct
pathway to distress was from experiential avoidance. This finding suggests that
experiential avoidance may have a central role in determining levels of distress in
individuals who have experienced psychosis. This is consistent with findings from
other clinical populations, which have demonstrated experiential avoidance to be a
significant predictor of distress, depression and general psychopathology (Chawla &
Ostafin, 2007; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004; Plumb et al., 2004).
Within the path model, a strong direct relationship was found between negative self-
schema and illness beliefs. This supports the significant positive correlation that was
found between the two variables, and indicates that individuals with negative self-
schematic beliefs are more likely to interpret the experience of psychosis in a negative
way. This finding is consistent with literature regarding the cognitive model, which
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suggests that underlying schemas may inform surface-level beliefs (Beck, 1976; Beck
etal., 1979).
Negative self-schema and illness beliefs were both found to be related to experiential
avoidance. Relationships were positive indicating that individuals with negative self-
schema and negative illness beliefs were more likely to show increased experiential
avoidance. This finding is consistent with previous research which has found that
avoidant coping behaviour is associated with both negative self-schema (Drayton et
al., 1998; Tait et al., 2004) and negative beliefs about psychosis (Chadwick &
Birchwood, 1994, 1995; Romme efa/., 1992).
The relationship between illness beliefs and experiential avoidance (p<.001) was
found to be stronger than the relationship between negative self-schema and
experiential avoidance (p<.05). This finding suggests that negative beliefs about
psychosis may be a greater contributor to experiential avoidance than negative
evaluative beliefs about the self (self-schema).
The current study hypothesised that experiential avoidance would act as a mediator
between negative self-schema and distress, and between illness beliefs and distress. A
mediator variable is one that accounts for a relationship between a predictor and an
outcome variable (Frazier et al., 2004). Therefore, evidence in support of a mediator
variable would suggest that some of the association between a predictor and outcome
could be explained by the inclusion of this variable. Thus, within the proposed model,
the indirect pathways through experiential avoidance were hypothesised to be more
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strongly associated with distress, than the direct pathways between negative self-
schema and distress, or between illness beliefs and distress.
Findings did not support the hypothesised role of experiential avoidance as a mediator
between negative self-schema and distress. The direct relationship between these
variables was found to be stronger than the indirect relationship through experiential
avoidance. Therefore, data suggests that negative self-schema is best conceptualised
as providing a direct contribution to variation in distress within this population, as
well as being a predictor of greater negative beliefs about psychosis.
Findings partially supported the hypothesis that experiential avoidance would mediate
the relationship between illness beliefs and distress. This hypothesis was only
partially supported because although the indirect relationship through experiential
avoidance was stronger than the direct relationship, this direct relationship was still
significant. Therefore, data suggests that the relationship between illness beliefs and
distress can be best explained by both a direct effect and an indirect effect through
experiential avoidance.
4.2 Clinical Implications
Increasing our understanding of factors that may predict distress in individuals with
psychosis has a number of important clinical implications. The presence of distress in
this population has been found to be common (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998; Birchwood,
Iqbal et al., 2000; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998), and is associated with a range of
negative outcomes, such as increased risk of suicide, relapse and exacerbation of
psychotic symptoms (Birchwood & Iqbal, 1998; Johnson, 1988; Jones et al., 1994).
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Therefore, understanding more about the processes that contribute to distress within
this population is of key importance, as this may inform therapeutic interventions and
consequently, influence outcomes.
Distress has traditionally been viewed as an inevitable consequence of the experience
of psychosis, and interventions were primarily focused on symptom reduction.
However, distress has been shown to occur independently of psychotic symptoms
(Birchwood, Iqbal et al., 2000), and for some individuals the occurrence of psychotic
symptoms does not necessarily result in significant levels of distress (Romme &
Escher, 1996). This has resulted in a shift away from viewing outcomes purely in
terms of symptom severity, and instead psychological outcomes such as distress, are
increasingly viewed as central.
In addition, mental health services for individuals with psychosis are increasingly
being influenced and driven by the concept of 'recovery'. Recovery is conceptualised
as much more than purely symptom improvement, and a range of social,
psychological and functional outcomes that may be important to the individual are
emphasised. It has been highlighted that recovery may occur even in the absence of
symptom improvement (Anthony, 1993). Psychological distress is viewed as critical
in influencing quality of life and functional outcomes. Therefore, research focusing on
distress as an outcome variable, and exploring factors which contribute to this, fits
appropriately within the recovery framework.
The current study examines both direct and indirect pathways to distress. This is of
importance, since it is highly likely that distress is associated with a number of
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possible variables, as well as being influenced by indirect and complex
interrelationships between various factors. Rarely within psychology are relationships
between factors simple and direct, therefore the importance of modelling specific
interrelationships between variables has been emphasised (Bramwell, 1996;
Breakwell, 1994).
Negative self-schema, beliefs about psychosis, and experiential avoidance, were all
found to have significant, direct relationships with distress. This suggests that by
targeting therapeutic interventions at these factors, distress may be reduced. In
addition, results suggest that experiential avoidance may have the strongest direct
relationship with distress. Therefore, this may indicate that even with continuing
negative self-schema and illness beliefs, psychological distress within this population
may be diminished by reducing experiential avoidance.
Experiential avoidance is recognised as a central theme within acceptance-based
interventions, such as ACT (Hayes et al., 1999; Hayes et al., 1996). It is described as
an unwillingness to remain in contact with particular private experiences, and
involves persistent attempts to alter the form or frequency of these experiences (Hayes
et al., 1999). Therapeutic techniques include undermining the literal meaning of
private experiences, so that thoughts and related emotions are experienced for what
they are, not what they say they are (Hayes et al, 1999). Ultimately, interventions that
address experiential avoidance attempt to change the way individuals interact with,
and relate to, their internal experiences by constructing alternative contexts for such
experiences. The presence of any particular internal experience is in itself not seen as
problematic, but rather difficulties arise from its contextually established functioning
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and meaning (Hayes, 2004). For example, problematic contexts would be seen as
those in which the literality of language dominates over direct experiential
responding, or social contexts which support the evaluation of certain experiences as
'good' or 'bad' (Hayes et al., 1999). Instead, ACT encourages the development of
contexts characterised by willingness or acceptance of internal experiences, and
contexts which are more likely to support the occurrence of valued behaviour (Hayes,
2004; Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 1999).
Interventions that aim to reduce experiential avoidance, conversely aim to increase
psychological acceptance, and movement towards valued goals. Therefore,
experiential avoidance is not seen in itself as an outcome goal, but rather it is
conceived as a process goal, through which greater psychological flexibility and
valued behaviour occurs (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001).
Acceptance-based interventions that are designed to target experiential avoidance
have demonstrated promising but preliminary results for a variety of psychological
conditions, including psychosis (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006;
Hayes et al., 2006; Ost, 2008).
The finding that each of the psychological variables investigated may uniquely and
independently contribute to the variance in distress, would seem to provide support
for both acceptance-based interventions and cognitive therapy. The relationships
between the variables are also of clinical interest. These findings appear to indicate
that focusing interventions at certain variables may consequently result in changes in
other related variables, which may in turn reduce distress.
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There are obvious differences between cognitive therapy and acceptance-based
approaches, especially with regard to the mechanisms through which change is
presumed to occur. However, similarities between the two approaches have also been
highlighted (Baer, 2003; Chadwick, 2006; Gaudiano, 2005). In particular, both
interventions are described as facilitating a detached or decentred view of internal
experience, such as thoughts (Baer, 2003; Chadwick, 2006; Teasdale et al., 2002). In
cognitive therapy, this observation of thought processes is conceptualised as a
mechanism through which thought content is modified or altered, rather than the
primary mechanism of therapeutic change (Teasdale et al., 2002). However, in
acceptance-based approaches, this process of decentring is used as a means of
attempting to change the way individuals interact with, or relate to, their internal
experiences (Hayes et al., 2006). Despite the differences between the two approaches,
it is increasingly recognised that they may be combined in order to increase treatment
effectiveness (Bach, Gaudiano, Pankey, Herbert & Hayes, 2006; Baer, 2003;
Chadwick, 2006; Gaudiano, 2005).
Findings from the current study suggest that different factors contribute to distress
within this population. Therefore, interventions that aim to address more than one of
these factors within the same therapeutic approach may result in greater reductions in
distress. It has been suggested that in relationships where there are more than one
mediator, treatment effectiveness should be maximised by utilising interventions that
address each of these variables (Frazier et al., 2004). These findings appear to provide
support for clinical interventions that aim to address dysfunctional cognitions in
addition to incorporating acceptance-based strategies that aim to undermine
experiential avoidance.
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In addition to the implications for direct clinical interventions with this client group,
this study also has broader implications for mental health services in general and the
systems that support individuals with psychosis. The influence of the recovery model
has gone some way to challenging the view that psychotic symptoms should be the
main focus of interventions, and necessarily have to be cured before an individual can
achieve improvements in functional, psychological and social outcomes. However,
the findings of this study also extend this change of ethos by supporting the concept
of acceptance. Findings suggest that acceptance of psychotic symptoms may be more
important in reducing distress than challenging negative beliefs about the self or the
experience of psychosis. Multidisciplinary teams, families, and service user groups,
may benefit from encouraging individuals with psychosis to pursue valued behaviours
despite the occurrence of psychotic symptoms, instead of struggling with the content
and meaning of such experiences.
4.3 Theoretical implications
The objective of the current study was to further knowledge and understanding
regarding psychological processes associated with distress in individuals who had
experienced psychosis. Although affective symptoms have long been associated with
psychotic disorders, Birchwood (2003) has commented that psychological research
has neglected the importance of distress and emotional recovery within this
population. The model presented in this study was shown to be relatively successful in
accounting for the variance in distress therefore, the findings are considered an
important addition to the knowledge base in this area.
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Acceptance-based theories are increasingly emphasising the importance of an
individual's relationship with their symptoms and internal experience in predicting
distress (Chadwick, 2006). Experiential avoidance, or unwillingness to remain in
contact with certain private experiences, has been implicated in various forms of
psychopathology within a range of clinical populations (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007;
Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al., 2004). However, despite increasing attention within
the empirical literature, research on experiential avoidance is still in its infancy.
Therefore, research exploring the concept further is of significant theoretical interest.
Presenting and testing hypothesised models of relationships between variables can
add important information to our understanding of factors, and increases the amount
of knowledge that might be gained from exploring such factors independently. This
study is unique in its integration of both acceptance-based concepts, such as
experiential avoidance, and cognitive factors, such as schemas and beliefs, within the
same model. The two approaches are seen to have theoretical and philosophical
differences (Forsyth, Lejuez, Hawkins & Eifert, 1996; Wilson et al., 1997), which
perhaps have previously hindered the development of theoretical models integrating
concepts from both traditions.
Cognitive therapy is based on the view that cognitions, in the form of attitudes, beliefs
and schemas, are considered to be the source of maladaptive behaviour and affect
(Beck et al., 1979; Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al., 1997). Interventions involve
attempts to modify the form, frequency, and intensity of various hypothesised
dysfunctional cognitions (Beck et al., 1979; Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al.,
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1997). The assumption of cognitive therapy is that "if the therapist gets the patient to
think or feel differently, they will act differently" (Forsyth et al., 1996, p.373).
Behavioural approaches, on the other hand, have been resistant to the concept of
cognitive causality (Forsyth et al., 1996; Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al., 1997).
Although acknowledging the importance of cognition in regulating behaviour, the role
is not seen as causal (Forsyth et al., 1996; Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al.,
1997). From a behaviour analytical viewpoint, thoughts and feelings do not cause
behaviour, except as regulated by context (Hayes et al., 2006). Therefore, changing
the context that causally links these psychological domains is central. Acceptance
strategies have been said to emerge from a behaviour analytic approach to cognition,
and in particular ACT has been described as developing from this contextual
behavioural understanding of private experiences (Wilson et al, 1997).
These theoretical and philosophical differences between traditions, have led to
differences in what should be targeted in therapy (Forsyth et al., 1996). Behavioural
approaches, instead of attempting to eliminate distressing thoughts or feelings, focus
on altering the struggle with such experiences. Therefore, the goal becomes one of
assisting the individual to engage in constructive behaviour despite what they think or
feel (Forsyth et al., 1996).
From the cognitive therapy perspective, modification of dysfunctional beliefs and
schemas is viewed as central to reducing distress. However, component analysis
studies of CBT for depression, have failed to find support for the importance of this
cognitive change (Gortner, Gollan, Dobson & Jacobson, 1998; Jacobson et al., 1996).
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These component analysis studies have compared a complete CBT treatment with
interventions focused exclusively on its two major components, behavioural
activation and behavioural activation with automatic thought modification (Gortner et
al., 1998; Jacobson et al., 1996). These studies found that behavioural interventions
were as effective in treating depression than interventions with added cognitive
treatment strategies. This finding was consistent for both immediate treatment
response (Jacobson et al., 1996) and up to two years post-treatment (Gortner et al.,
1998).
Although findings from these component analysis studies raise important questions
for the literature, they should be interpreted cautiously, and by no means represent
conclusive evidence that cognitive change is ineffective. Cognitive therapy is
supported by a large body of data, and the cognitive model has been highly influential
in guiding developments within psychology. However, the findings do highlight
questions regarding the mechanisms through which cognitive change may take place
(Jacobson et al., 1996), and whether cognitive change is always necessary in order to
influence clinical improvement (Dobson & Khatri, 2000; Hayes, 2004).
Jacobson et al. (1996) highlight that behavioural treatments may be a more effective
method of changing cognitions than explicit attempts to alter thoughts. Acceptance-
based perspectives also consider that there are substantial problems with the cognitive
therapy solution of verbally altering or challenging dysfunctional thoughts (Hayes,
Strosahl, Bunting el al., 2004). Such interventions may reinforce the idea that
individuals must control thoughts and feelings, since these are interpreted as reasons
for behavioural outcomes (Hayes et al., 1999). Deliberate attempts to alter cognitions,
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necessarily involve following a verbal rule that contains the thought that the
individual is trying to avoid or change (Hayes et al., 1999; Wilson et ah, 1997).
Therefore, the resultant effect of this may actually be a strengthening of the original
thought.
Acceptance-based approaches assume that cognitive change may not be necessary to
alter the function of an individual's internal experiences. Instead, acceptance, or
willingness to experience negatively evaluated private experiences is fostered through
techniques that undermine experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion. From a
cognitive therapy viewpoint modification of dysfunctional cognitions is central to
producing change and clinical improvements in affect and behaviour. Cognitive
therapy itself can be seen as creating a context of deliteralisation in which the
believability of thoughts are reduced. Therefore, the process of cognitive change may
allow a more defused perspective from internal experiences, and this in itself may
lead to increased acceptance and willingness. It has been emphasised that the two
change processes postulated by cognitive and acceptance-based approaches are not
necessarily mutually exclusive (Wilson et al., 1997).
The current study can be considered to add to the theoretical knowledge regarding
content and process factors associated with distress in individuals with psychosis. By
integrating cognitive and acceptance-based factors within this study, the relative
contributions of cognitive content factors and process factors, such as experiential
avoidance have been compared. The finding that experiential avoidance is more
strongly related to distress than either negative self-schema or illness beliefs supports
acceptance-based theories. The study also found that beliefs about psychosis and
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negative self-schema were related to experiential avoidance. This finding could be
interpreted as supporting cognitive theories, which suggest that increased acceptance
may result from altering dysfunctional cognitions.
It has been suggested that the differences in perspectives between the two traditions
regarding the causality of cognition may not be resolved by empirical research alone
(Forsyth et al., 1996; Hayes & Wilson, 1995; Wilson et al., 1997). Rather such
differences are viewed as matters of philosophical assumptions (Forsyth et al., 1996;
Hayes & Wilson, 1995). However, despite differences between the two traditions at
the level of theory and philosophy, the two approaches have been said to have a large
body of shared values, which provides potential for integration (Forsyth et al., 1996;
Wilson et al., 1997). In fact, behavioural therapies have already been successfully
integrated with cognitive therapy (CBT) despite differing philosophical assumptions
(Dobson & Khatri, 2000). Therefore, there is reason to assume that the integration of
cognitive and acceptance-based approaches could add to our theoretical understanding
regarding processes of change. Wilson et al. (1997) stated that 'collaboration of
efforts may allow us to direct our efforts at the development of the efficient and
effective empirically based treatments that the modem era of mental health services
surely requires' (p.60).
4.4 Strengths and limitations of study
4.4.1 Study design
This study employed a cross-sectional design, in which data were gathered from each
participant at a single time point. Such designs are unable to infer the direction of
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causality between variables. Therefore, conclusions regarding the causal nature of
relationships in this study are limited. Although the model within this study proposed
directional relationships, it could perhaps be equally likely that variables were related
in the opposite direction than that proposed. For example, it may be possible that the
presence of distress may cause greater experiential avoidance, or that negative beliefs
about illness may cause negative self-schematic beliefs.
The proposed relationships within the model were based on underlying theory and
previous research findings. Therefore, it may be considered reasonable to assume the
direction of relationships based on such information. However, future research would
benefit from investigating these variables within a longitudinal design, in order to
determine more about the nature of causality and to explore how these relationships
change in relation to one another.
This study formed part of a collaborative research design in which data were collected
for the purpose of two concurrent research studies. This methodological approach
adds to the strength of the project in a number ofways, most notably by increasing the
possible sample size available.
Due to the nature of symptoms inherent in this population, individuals with psychosis
can be a difficult client group to recruit to research studies. Individuals within this
population can often be guarded, suspicious and mistrustful of engaging with research
studies, especially studies which require them to answer questions regarding their
psychotic experiences. Within such a population, some individuals may also have had
experience of being admitted to hospital against their will, under Mental Health
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legislation, or may be dissatisfied with their experiences of mental health services.
Such experiences are likely to contribute to engagement difficulties and make
individuals wary of participating in research that is connected with, or being carried
out within, mental health services.
Individuals with psychosis are considered a vulnerable population and therefore, a
number of ethical issues also contribute to difficulties in recruiting such participants
to research studies. These difficulties include cognitive and emotional vulnerabilities
often associated with this population, the presence of acute and intense distress, and
concerns regarding capacity to consent.
Given the population of interest, by employing a collaborative design, and collecting
data across two different geographical areas, the study has been able to expand the
potential sample available and achieve a data set of substantial size.
4.4.2 Sample
This was a voluntary research study, and so participants were free to choose whether
or not to participate. As with all study designs of this nature it is possible that a
recruitment bias may have been present. Recruitment bias suggests that certain types
of participant are more likely to agree to take part in studies than others, therefore
creating a bias in results. However, as outlined, this is a common feature of many
research designs, and it is difficult to overcome such an issue given the voluntary
nature of studies. The sample in the current study were recruited from a variety of
different services, including NHS and voluntary agencies, and individuals with
varying levels of symptom severity and chronicity of psychosis. Due to this, the
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chances of such a recruitment bias significantly influencing results was considered
minimal.
The inclusion criteria for the current study was purposely designed to be
encompassing of all individuals who had experienced psychotic symptoms, rather
than focusing on specific diagnoses. This approach increases the generalisability of
findings across this population, and is also consistent with a move towards symptom-
based perspectives.
Although the heterogeneity of this sample is a strength with regard to generalisability,
it is possible that this may also limit the findings. Previous studies have shown that
the role of psychological factors may differ according to the specific type of psychotic
symptom experienced. For example, Smith et al. (2006) found that persecutory
delusions were more likely to be associated with negative evaluations of self and
others, depression and low self-esteem. Whereas, grandiose delusions were associated
with less negative self-evaluations, lower depression and higher self-esteem.
Therefore, it is possible that results may have been influenced depending on the
proportions of specific symptoms within the sample. Future research may benefit
from replicating these findings whilst differentiating between different types of
psychotic symptoms.
4.4.3 Procedure
Measures were administered to participants in an interview-style format, in which a
researcher was present whilst the participant completed each of the questionnaires.
This was done in case the participant had any questions, or needed support to
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complete the questionnaires, and to ensure that all the measures were completed
appropriately. This was considered a significant strength of the study as it reduced the
occurrence of any missing or unusable data, and also reduced the burden on
participants by offering them individual support.
All participants were offered assistance to complete the measures if required. This
primarily consisted of the researcher reading the measures aloud to participants and
recording their responses. Such assistance was offered due to the vulnerabilities
present in this client group, and in order to reduce burden. However, all the measures
used in the current study were designed as self-report measures and it may be possible
that administering the measures in this way may have reduced their validity.
In addition, as a consequence of the collaborative study design, data were collected by
two different researchers, one within each of the two different geographical areas.
Therefore, it is possible that there may have been differences in the way each
researcher administered the measures to participants, especially if extra assistance was
required. It was considered possible that this may have then produced biases, and
influenced the data collected. However, in an attempt to minimise this possibility, a
standardised procedure was developed and followed by both researchers.
4.5 Future Research
Future research would benefit from investigating these factors within a longitudinal
study design. Such research would further conclusions regarding the direction of
causality between variables. Exploring how variables change in relation to one
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another would also be of clinical relevance, as this would help inform therapeutic
interventions.
It would also be of clinical and theoretical interest to replicate this study whilst
differentiating between specific types of psychotic symptoms, and also investigating
the influence of symptom severity on some of these factors and interrelationships.
Further studies exploring relationships between cognitive and acceptance-based
factors would also be of interest. In particular, examining these factors in relation to
the occurrence of valued behaviour. Cognitive and acceptance-based theories differ in
their view of the processes that influence adaptive, constructive behaviour. Cognitive
approaches view dysfunctional cognitions as an obstruction to the occurrence of
constructive behaviour, whereas acceptance-based approaches address experiential
avoidance as a process that diminishes valued behaviour. Therefore, comparing the
relative influence of cognitions and experiential avoidance on valued behaviour could
have significant clinical and theoretical implications.
4.6 Overall summary and conclusions
A number of significant direct and indirect relationships were found between the
variables of negative self-schema, illness beliefs, experiential avoidance and
psychological distress. The model presented appears to be modestly successful in
accounting for the variance in the hypothesised relationships. Distress was
significantly related to all three variables, but was most strongly associated with
experiential avoidance. This suggests that experiential avoidance may have an
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important role with respect to influencing levels of distress amongst individuals with
psychosis.
There are a number of limitations to the current study, and it is important to give
appropriate consideration to these when interpreting the findings. However, there are
also a number of strengths of the study, such as the collaborative design, substantial
sample size and heterogeneity of sample. These strengths contribute to the
generalisability of findings.
Findings from this study have important clinical implications, as distress is
increasingly viewed as a central therapeutic outcome, rather than symptom severity.
Results appear to support the use of both cognitive therapy and acceptance-based
approaches with this client group. It is suggested that reductions in distress may be
maximised if strategies from both approaches are utilised within the same
intervention. Findings may also have implications for the wider systems that support
individuals with psychosis, as it is suggested that an ethos which supports acceptance
of psychotic symptoms may be more important in reducing distress than challenging
negative beliefs about the self or the experience of psychosis.
This study contributes to the knowledge base regarding factors associated with
distress in individuals with psychosis, and also adds to the growing literature on
experiential avoidance. It is unique in that it incorporates both acceptance-based
concepts and cognitive factors within the same model. Theoretical and philosophical
differences exist between the two approaches, which have led to differences in what
should be targeted in therapy. Cognitive therapy views dysfunctional content of
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thoughts as central to influencing distress, whereas acceptance-based approaches view
experiential avoidance as a key process in this outcome. The current study can be
considered to add to the theoretical knowledge regarding content and process factors
associated with distress in individuals with psychosis. By integrating cognitive and
acceptance-based factors within the same model, the relative contributions of
cognitive content factors and process factors, such as experiential avoidance have
been able to be compared.
Future studies would benefit from developing further models examining the
relationships between cognitive and acceptance-based factors.
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Appendix 1 - Measures
Brief Core Schema Scales (BCSS)
Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-Revised (PBIQ-R)
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II)
Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation outcome measure (CORE)
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The Brief Core Schema Scales: beliefs about self and others
This questionnaire lists beliefs that people can hold about themselves and other people. Please
indicate whether you hold each belief (NO or YES). If you hold the belief then please indicate how
strongly you hold it by circling a number (1-4). Try to judge the beliefs on how you have generally, over
time, viewed yourself and others. Do not spend too long on each belief. There are no right or wrong
answers and the first response to each belief is often the most accurate.
Believe it Believe it Believe it Believe it
slightly moderately very much totally
MYSELF
I am unloved NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
I am worthless NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
I am weak NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
I am vulnerable NO YES 1 2 3 4
I am bad NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
I am a failure NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
I am respected NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
I am valuable NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
I am talented NO YES —» 1 2 3 4
I am successful NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
I am good NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
I am interesting NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
OTHERS
Other people are hostile NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
Other people are harsh NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
Other people are unforgiving NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
Other people are bad NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
Other people are devious NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
Other people are nasty NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
Other people are fair NO YES —» 1 2 3 4
Other people are good NO YES -» 1 2 3 4
Other people are trustworthy NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
Other people are accepting NO YES —> 1 2 3 4
Other people are supportive NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
Other people are truthful NO YES -> 1 2 3 4
Personal Beliefs about Illness Questionnaire-revised (PBIQ-R)
Please tick the following as they apply to you: SD = Strongly disagree
D = Disagree
A = Agree
SA = Strongly agree
SD D A SA
1 I will always need to be cared for by professional medical
staff.
2 My illness frightens me.
3 I can talk to most people about my illness.
4 I am capable of very little as a result ofmy illness.
5 Because ofmy illness I have to rely on psychiatric services.
6 My illness stops me doing the things I want to do.
7 I find it difficult to cope with my current symptoms.
8 I am the same person I was before my illness.
9 I know when I'm relapsing but I can't do anything about it.
10 My illness is a judgement on me.
11 I am powerless to influence or control my illness.
12 My illness stops me getting on with things I want to do.
13 Society needs to keep people with my illness apart from
everyone else.
14 I feel excluded because ofmy illness.
15 I am embarrassed by my illness.
16 My illness is too delicate/brittle for me to work or keep a job.
17 I am ashamed about my illness.
18 Because ofmy illness 1 don't fit in.
19 I have changed for the worse because of my illness.
20 I can get on with others as well as I used to.
21 My illness prevents me from having friends and relationships.
22 My illness prevents me from planning for my future.
23 My relationship with my friends has changed for the worse.
24 I feel an outsider because ofmy illness.
25 I am intimidated by my illness.
26 I feel trapped by my illness.
27 Because ofmy illness others see me as fragile or weak.
28 I have the same goals now as I had before my illness.
29 Others look down on me because ofmy illness.
AAQ-II
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a number next to
it. Use the scale below to make your choice.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never very seldom seldom sometimes frequently almost always always
true true true true true true true
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant.
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that
would value.
3. I'm afraid of my feelings.
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.
6. I am in control of my life.
7. Emotions cause problems in my life.
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.
9. Worries get in the way of my success.
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want to live my life.
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
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F First Therapy Session
P Pre-therapy (unspecified)
D During Therapy
L Last therapy session
X Follow up 1
Y Follow up 2
Stage
Episode
IMPORTANT - PLEASE READ THIS FIRST
This form has 34 statements about how you have been OVER THE LAST WEEK.
Please read each statement and think how often you felt that way last week.
Then tick the box which is closest to this.
Please use a dark pen (not pencil) and tick clearly within the boxes.
&
Over the last week <5>^
1 1 have felt terribly alone and isolated □ 0 _l □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 F
2 1 have felt tense, anxious or nervous □ 0 □ □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 P
3 1 have felt 1 have someone to turn to for support when needed □ * □ 3 □ 2 □ - □ ° F
4 1 have felt O.K. about myself □h □I3 □ 2 □ • □ ° W
5 1 have felt totally lacking in energy and enthusiasm □i° □b □i2 □i3 □i4 P
6 1 have been physically violent to others □l° □ □i2 □i3 □ 4 R
7 1 have felt able to cope when things go wrong □b □I3 □i2 □i' □|0
8 1 have been troubled by aches, pains or other physical problems □l° □i2 □Is □I4 p
9 1 have thought of hurting myself □l° □i2 □i3 □I4 R
10 Talking to people has felt too much for me □l° □r □i2 □i3 □I4 F
11 Tension and anxiety have prevented me doing important things □l° □r □i2 □i3 □I4 P
12 I have been happy with the things I have done. □l- □i3 □i2 □i' □1° F
13 I have been disturbed by unwanted thoughts and feelings □l □i' □i2 □i3 □I4 P
14 I have felt like crying □l° □- □i2 □i3 □I4 W
Please turn over
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Over the last week ^ ^ ^ ^ /V
15 1 have felt panic or terror □ 0 □ • □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ P
16 I made plans to end my life □ 0 □ ■ □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 n R
17 I have felt overwhelmed by my problems □ 0 □ □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 W
18 I have had difficulty getting to sleep or staying asleep □ 0 □ • □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 P
19 1 have felt warmth or affection for someone □ * □I3 □ 2 □ • □ ° F
20 My problems have been impossible to put to one side □1° □I1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 P
21 1 have been able to do most things 1 needed to □I4 □I3 □ 2 □ ■ □ ° F
22 1 have threatened or intimidated another person □1° □ □ 2 □I3 □ 4 R
23 1 have felt despairing or hopeless □1° □1- □ 2 □I3 _) 4 P
24 1 have thought it would be better if 1 were dead □1° □ ' □I2 □I3 □ 4 R
25 1 have felt criticised by other people □1° LL □I2 □I3 □I4 F
26 1 have thought 1 have no friends □1° □1- □I2 □I3 □I4 F
27 1 have felt unhappy □1° □I' □I2 □I3 □I4
28 Unwanted images or memories have been distressing me □1° □I2 □I3 □I4 P
29 1 have been irritable when with other people □1° □I2 □I3 □I4
30 1 have thought 1 am to blame for my problems and difficulties □1° □r □I2 □I3 □I4
31 1 have felt optimistic about my future □I4 □I3 □I2 □I1 □ |o W
32 1 have achieved the things 1 wanted to □I4 □I3 □I2 □\ □|0
33 I have felt humiliated or shamed by other people □1° □I □I2 □I3 □|4
34 1 have hurt myself physically or taken dangerous risks with □1° □I2 □I3 □I4 R
my health
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
Total Scores
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Mean Scores — r
(Total score for each dimension divided by
number of items completed in that dimension) ———
(W) (P) (F) (R) All items All minus R
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Title: Does Acceptance Affect Distress in a Psychosis Population?
Forth Valley
You have been asked to participate in the above research study. Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it
is important for you to understand why the research is being undertaken and what it will involve. Please take time to read
the following information carefully. You may decide to discuss it with others. If there is anything that is unclear, or if you
would like more information, please do not hesitate to ask the researcher.
Purpose of the study
The aim of this study is to investigate how acceptance affects levels of emotional distress and valued living (whether you
behave in ways that are consistent with what you value in life) in individuals who have experienced symptoms of psychosis
(hallucinations, delusional beliefs and/or thought disturbances).
Do I have to take part?
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can decide whether or not you wish to take part. If you decide not to
take part, this decision will not affect the treatment or standard of care you receive in any way. If you decide you would like
to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form, however once you have signed this you are still free to withdraw at
any time.
What will happen if I agree to take part?
The researcher will arrange a time to meet with you, during which they will ask you to complete some questionnaires about
your experiences, beliefs and feelings. This should take approximately 30-45 minutes. Completing the questionnaires may
involve thinking about some difficult experiences, so it is possible that you may find some questions upsetting - if you do
feel uncomfortable you will be able to take a break or discontinue. If the researcher is concerned about your level of
distress as a result of taking part in this study, they may contact your keyworker or other relevant health care professional,
so that you may receive additional support.
Will my responses be confidential?
Yes. All the information you provide will be kept confidential. The questionnaires will be anonymous so your name will not
appear on any of your responses, and questionnaires will not be entered in to your medical notes. All information obtained
in the study will be stored securely in the Adult Clinical Psychology Department at Falkirk & District Royal Infirmary where
it will be kept for a period of two years.
What will happen to the results of this study?
Data collected in this study will be analysed in two separate projects - one within NHS Forth Valley and one within NHS
Fife - all data will be completely anonymous so your identity will not be known to the other health board. Results will be
submitted to the University of Edinburgh in part fulfilment of the researchers' doctorate in Clinical Psychology and will also
be circulated at a local level within NHS Forth Valley and NHS Fife. Findings may be submitted for publication in an
academic journal or presented at relevant conferences, however no identifying information regarding participants will be
included in any reports or presentations. If you are interested in receiving information about the results, you will be able to
obtain a summary report from your keyworker once the study has been completed.
Has the proposed study been reviewed by an ethics committee?
The Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics, which has responsibility for scrutinising proposals for medical
research on humans, has examined this research proposal and has raised no objections from the point of view of medical
ethics.
Further information
If you require further information about this study, or have any questions or concerns, you can contact the researcher,
Rebecca Lower, (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) on telephone number 01324 614347. If at any time, you wish to make a
complaint about any aspect of this research study, you can do so by contacting NHS Forth Valley, Acute Service
Headquarters, Westburn Avenue, Falkirk FK1 5SU and following the normal NHS complaints procedure.
Page 1 of 1
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Name of psychiatrist (if not referrer):
• Have you discussed the research project with the potential participant?
• Have you provided the potential participant with an information sheet regarding the
research?
Yes Q No |
• Is the client agreeable to the researcher contacting them directly regarding
participation in the research?
Are there any risk factors or reasons why a lone home visit should not be carried out with
this patient?
If yes, please specify:
Please return the completed form to:
Rebecca Lower, Adult Clinical Psychology Department, FDRI, FK1 5QE
Appendix 4 - Participant consent form
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Participant identification number: NHS
Forth Valley
CONSENT FORM
Title of study: Does Acceptance Affect Distress in a Psychosis Population?
Researchers:
Rebecca Lower (Trainee Clinical Psychologist, NHS Forth Valley)
Laura Weinberg (Trainee Clinical Psychologist, NHS Fife)
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the participant
information sheet dated 18.09.07 (version 4) for the
above study.
2. I have had the opportunity to consider the information,
ask questions and have had these answered
satisfactorily.
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any
reason, without my health care being affected.
4. I understand that if participation in this study causes me
distress, the researcher may contact my keyworker or
other relevant health care professional.
5. I agree to take part in the above study.
Name of participant Date Signature
Name of researcher Date Signature
15/07/07; Version 3
Appendix 5 - Ethics approval
Ethics committee approval letter
Ethics committee letter approving amendment to participant information sheet




Fife, Forth Valley & Tayside Research Ethics Service
Tayside
Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics A
Research Ethics Office
Level 9
Ninewells Hospital & Medical School
DUNDEE
DD19SY
Ms Rebecca Lower, Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Forth Valiey NHS / University of Edinburgh
Adult Clinical Psychology Department

















Full title of study:
REC reference number:
The relationship between seff-schema, illness beliefs, experiential
avoidance and psychological distress in individuals with psychosis.
07/S1401/98
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on
31 August 2007. Thank you for attending to discuss the study.
Ethical opinion
Members of the Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the
basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation.
You also should update the Participant Information Sheet, and provide me with a revised copy
(version 4, new date), as follows.
1. State where and for how long the study data will be kept, eg.:
Ail information obtained in the study will be stored securely in the Adult Clinical Psychology
Department at Falkirk & District Royal Infirmary where it will be kept for a period of two years.
2. State that the research has been reviewed by this ethics committee, as follows.
The Tayside Committee on Medicai Research Ethics, which has responsibility for scrutinising
proposals for medical research on humans, has examined this proposal and has raised no
objections from the point of view of medical ethics.
Ethical review of research sites
We have not yet had the outcome of any Site Specific Assessment (SSA) for this application. We wili
notify you in due course of the Fife and Forth Valley Research Ethics Committee's decision for your
SSA.
Conditions of approval
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out in the attached
document. You are advised to study the conditions carefully.
Approved documents




Application 5.4 31 July 2007
Investigator CV 24 July 2007
Protocol 6 03 July 2007
Covering Letter 30 July 2007
Letter from Sponsor 01 August 2007
Compensation Arrangements - Liability Insurance 28 July 2006
Compensation Arrangements 20 July 2007
Questionnaire: AAQ-2
Questionnaire: Personal Beliefs about Illness PBIQ
Questionnaire: Clinical Outcomes Routine Evaluation CORE
Questionnaire: The Brief Core Schema Scales
Questionnaire: Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales
GP/Consultant Information Sheets 2 31 July 2007
Participant Information Sheet 3 15 July 2007
Participant Consent Form 3 15 July 2007
Demographic Information
Valued Living Questionnaire 5-20-02
Letter from Supervisor 06 July 2007
CV Dr Sean Harper 15 July 2007
R&D approval
The study should not commence at any NHS site until the local Principal Investigator has obtained
final approval from the R&D office for the relevant NHS care organisation.
Membership of the Committee
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are listed on the attached
sheet.
Statement of compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics
Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research
Ethics Committees in the UK.




Fife Forth Valley Tayside
Fife, Forth Valley & Tayside Research Ethics Service
Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics A
Research Ethics Office
Level 9
Ninewells Hospital & Medical School
DUNDEE
DD1 9SY
Ms Rebecca Lower, Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Forth Valley NHS / University of Edinburgh
Adult Clinical Psychology Department

















Full title of study:
REC reference number:
The relationship between self-schema, illness beliefs, experiential
avoidance and psychological distress in individuals with psychosis.
07/S1401/98
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on 31 August 2007. Thank
you for your recent communication, which was received on 21 September 2007 and included the following
document
Document Version Date
Covering Letter 18 September 2007
Participant Information Sheet 4 18 September 2007
On behalf of the Research Ethics Committee I am pleased to reaffirm the favourable opinion given to this
application.




Copy to: Marise Bucukoglu
Clinical Trials & Research Governance Manager
The University of Edinburgh



















Adult Clinical Psychology Department















Following approval from the Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics A on 24 September 2007 1 am
pleased to confirm that I formally gave Management approval to 'The relationship between self schema,
illness beliefs, experiential avoidance and psychological distress in indi viduals with psychosis' on 9 October
2007.
The Research Governance Framework for Health and Community Care applies to all research undertaken
within NHS Forth Valley. T he Framework sets out standards and details the key responsibilities of key
individuals, including the research sponsor, principle investigator, other researchers and supervisors of
students undertaking research.
All those involved in the project wilt be required to work within accepted guidelines of research governance
and IHC-GCP guidelines.
A copy of the Framework and links to background annex material can be accessed via the Chief Scientist
Office website at http://www.show.scot.nlis.uk,cso.'ResGov/ResGov.litni and ICTI-GEP guidelines may be found
at http: '.'www, ich.org.ndflCH 'eb.pdt'
You/
Chairman Ian Mullen BSc MRPhannS 01.
Chief Executive Fiona Mackenzie MA(hons) MBA MIHM dipHSM





You will be required to provide a progress report on your study at the end of the study. We will also require
a copy of the final report, when available. You will also be asked annually to complete a form on the activity
taking place in relation to the study within Forth Valley, for each Financial year during which it is active





c.c. Dr Sean Harper, Clinical Psychologist, University of Edinburgh
Dr Theresa Houseman, Clinical Psychologist, Adult Clinical Psychology Department, FDRI, NHS
Forth Valley
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